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Introduction
This Contractor Report starts out with a paper providing an overview of the Cognitive
Systems Engineering approach. Following this introduction, two papers present the
results of a series of complementary studies of pilot interaction with one of the core
systems of cockpit automation - the Flight Management System (FMS) 1.
These studies apply concepts and techniques from Cognitive Systems Engineering to
problems of human interaction with advanced automated systems in aerospace
applications. Thus, the results have implications for the aviation community. They
expand on Wiener's concept of 'clumsy automation' and may therefore be of great
interest to designers of flight deck automation and designers of training programs for
glass cockpit pilots.
At a more general level, exploring issues surrounding human-automation interaction in
the context of advanced flight decks provides new insights that add to and extend the
research base relevant to Cognitive Systems Engineering. They speak to issues such as
human-computer cooperation in event-driven domains and techniques for studying
cognitive systems in the field.
The fourth paper in this report addresses one of the challenges for design and training
in aviation as well as in a variety of other domains, the problem of mode awareness and
mode error. The need for a better understanding of the processes underlying these
phenomena and for a revision of the concept in the face of increasingly automated
environments is emphasized.
The studies reported here are one part of a larger program of research designed to
advance the foundations of Cognitive Systems Engineering in order to bring new
concepts and techniques to bear on questions surrounding human-centered automation
in aerospace applications.
1Other papers on related research about human interaction with advanced technology
produced by the researchers in the Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory can be obtained
by contacting: David Woods, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State
University, Columbus, OH 43210; Fax: 614-292-7852; Email: woods@csel.eng.ohio-state.edu
Cognitive Systems in Context
- Joint Cognitive Systems and Research on Human-Machine Systems -
David D. Woods
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
The Ohio State University
NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
Many organizations have experienced significant difficulties in turning AI research and other
new developments in computational technology into systems that actually improve performance
in the target feld of practice (e.g., space, flightdecks, air traffic control, nuclear power plant
control rooms, communication network management, ground satellite control stations).
Flexibility and customizability are the hallmarks of today's information technology as compared
to previous media for data handling and display. First, ubiquitous computerization has
tremendously advanced our ability to collect, transmit and transform data. In all areas of human
endeavor, we are bombarded with computer processed data, especially when anomalies occur.
Second, user interface technology has allowed us to concentrate this expanding field of data into
one physical platform, typically a single VDU, by providing the capability to manage multiple
windows and the capability to generate tremendous networks of computer displays as a kind of
virtual perceptual field viewable through the narrow aperture of the VDU. Third, heuristic and
algorithmic technologies expand the range of subtasks and cognitive activities that can be
automated. These intelligent space machines create joint cognitive systems that distribute
cognitive work across multiple agents (Woods, 1986; Roth, Bennett and Woods, 1987; Hutchins,
1990).
But these and other vectors of technological change can create new burdens and complexities for
the human practitioners responsible for achieving goals within some field of activity (Woods,
Cook and Sarter, 1992; Woods, 1993). Our ability to digest and interpret data has failed to keep
pace with our abilities to generate and manipulate greater and greater amounts of data. Thus,
one result of the vectors of technology change is the data overload syndrome. Practitioners get
lost in large networks of computer based display frames; they experience keyhole effects in
trying to monitor dynamic systems through the narrow aperture of even a windowed computer
screen; they fail to focus on the critically relevant data in a specific context out of the massive
field of available data (Woods, in press). It has turned out that using new computational
possibilities to create effective human-machine ensembles, what we will refer to as joint or
distributed cognitive systems, is a substantive issue at the intersection of cognitive psychology,
software engineering, social psychology and axtifidal intelligence (Hollnagel and Woods, 1983;
Woods, 1986).
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Cognitive Systems Engineering is the emerging discipline which directly confronts the question
of how to use the huge space of possibilities provided by today's computational power
(Hollnagel and Woods, 1983; Wo(xis and Roth, 1988). This means that cognitive engineering
research focuses on how people solve problems with tools. This is in contrast to the typical
model for laboratory research which continues to examine human problem solving in the
absence of even simple tools, e.g., pencil and paper. The tools in question include different
kinds of external representations of the domain via control boards, display panels, and
computer displays/controls and different kinds of support systems such as AI diagnostic
systems, alerting and alarm systems, and new forms of information.
Cognitive Work in the Wild
Technology change is one departure point for seeing the role of Cognitive Systems Engineering.
Another departure point is to think about cognition in the wild, particularly fields of activity
that involve advanced technology. If we look at flightdecks of commercial jet airliners or control
centers that manage space missions, or surgical operating rooms or control rooms that manage
chemical or energy processes or control centers that monitor telecommunication networks or
many other fields of human activity, what do we see?
First, we do not see cognitive activity isolated in a single individual, but rather cognitive activity
goes on distributed across multiple agents (Hutchins, in press). Second, we do not see cognitive
activity separated in a thoughtful individual, but rather as a part of a stream of activity (Klein et
al., 1992). Third, we see these sets of active agents embedded in a larger group, professional,
organizational, institutional context which constrains their activities, sets up rewards and
punishments, defines not altogether consistent goals, and provides resources. Fourth, we see
phases of activity with transitions and evolutions. Cognitive and physical activity ebbs and
flows, with periods of lower activity and more self paced tasks interspersed with busy, high
tempo, externally paced operations where task performance is more critical. Higher tempo
situations create greater need for cognitive work and at the same time often create greater
constraints on cognitive activity (e.g., time pressure, uncertainty, exceptional circumstances,
failures and their associated hazards). We see that there are consequences at stake for the
individuals and the groups and organizations involved in the field of activity or affected by that
field of activity - economic, personal, safety.
Fifth, even a causal glance at these domains reveals that tools of all types are everywhere;
almost all activity is aided by something or someone beyond the unit of the individual cognitive
agent. More in depth observation reveals that the technology is often not well adapted to the
needs of the practitioner - that much of the tL=chnology is dumsy in that it makes new demands
on the practitioner, demands that tend to congregate at the higher tempo or higher criticality
periods (Woods, 1993). Close observation reveals that people and systems of people (operators,
designers, regulators, etc.) are adapting the tools and adapting their activities continuously to
respond to indications of trouble or to meet new demands. Furthermore, new machines are not
used as the designers intended, but are shaped by practitioners to the contingencies of the field
of activity in a locally pragmatic way (Woods et al., 1992).
Cognitive Systems
The reverberations of technology change and observations of cognitive work in the wild lead us
to the basic point of departure for a Cognitive Systems Engineering. This is the idea suggested
by Hollnagel and Woods (1983) and Hutchins (1991) among others that one can look at
operational systems - the individual people, the organization both formal and informal, the
high technology artifacts (Al, automation, intelligent tutoring systems, computer-based
visualization) and the low technology artifacts (displays, alarms, procedures, paper notes,
training programs) intended to support human practitioners - that one can look at all of these
things as a single cognitive system.
Operational systems can be thought of as joint and distributed human-machine cognitive
systems in that:
1. one can describe and study and design these systems in terms of cognitive concepts such
as information flow, knowledge activation, control of attention, etc.,
2. cognitive systems are distributed over multiple agents both multiple people and mixtures
of people and apparently animate, agent-like machines,
3. external artifacts function as cognitive tools that modify the activities of agents within the
cognitive system,
There is a reciprocal relationship or mutual shaping between properties of external artifacts
and representations of aspects of the field of activity and the cognitive activities
distributed within the cognitive system. Properties of these artifacts and representations
shape practitioner cognitive strategies and in turn these artifacts are shaped by
practitioners to function as tools within the field of activity.
4. cognitive systems adapt to the demands of the field of practice.
Hence, the cognitive systems perspective can be summarized by the triad - cognition in context,
cooperation, and tools.
COGNITIVE SYSTEMS AND CONTEXT
In Cognitive Systems Engineering we are concerned with cognitive work within complex fields
of practice - highly coupled domains, event-driven dynamic situations, the possibility of
multiple interacting faults. This means that a cognitive systems approach is context bound - the
study of cognition is intimately linked to the study of the situation in which it occurs. To do this
requires studies of specific meaningful tasks as carried out by actual practitioners. However, to
say that the study of human-machine systems can and should be context bound is not simply to
call for more applied studies in particular domains. It is, ..., the fundamental principle of
cognition that the universal can be perceived only in the particular, while the particular can be
thought of only in reference to the universal" (Cassirer, 19,53, p. 86). As Hutchins puts it, "rhere
are powerful regularities to be described at a level of analysis that transcends the details of the
specific domain". It is not possible to discover these regularities without understanding the
details of the domain, but the regularities are not about the domain specific details, they are
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about the nature of human cognition in human activity.''2 This reveals the proper
complementarity between so called basic and applied work where the experimenter functions as
designer and the designer as experimenter (Woods, 1992). "New technology is a kind of
experimental investigation into fields of ongoing activity. If we truly understand cognitive
systems, then we must be able to develop designs that enhance the performance of operational
systems; if we are to enhance the performance of operational systems, we need conceptual
looking glasses that enable us to see past the unending variety of technology and particular
domains (Woods and Sarter, in press).
The experimenter as designer? Cognitive tools are ubiquitous; technology change implicitly
changes cognitive systems by changes in agent-like machines and by changes in artifacts that
constrain cognitive work. This means new technology is a kind of experimental manipulation
that can be exploited to help understand human cognition as expressed in meaningful fields of
practice.
The designer as experimenter? The possibilities of technology seem to afford designers great
degrees of freedom. The possibilities seem less constrained by questions of feasibility and more
by concepts about how to use the possibilities skillfully to meet operational and other goals. In
other words, in order for designs to be developed in a problem-driven manner, as opposed to
the more typical technology-driven fashion, in order for designs to provide real and not illusory
benefits for real operational systems, the designer must adopt the attitude of an experimenter
trying to understand and model of the dynamics of cognitive systems.
To conceive of the experimenter as designer and designer as experimenter requires a drastic
shift in the normal attitude of researchers and developers towards the subjects of their work -
people and technology. Instead of separate and independent topics they are intimately
interconnected as parts of a larger and more useful system boundary - a joint cognitive system.
To conceive of the experimenter as designer and designer as experimenter shifts the relationship
between "basic' and "applied' research. The above concepts mean that these activities are
complimentary where growing the research base and developing effective applications are
mutually inter-dependent (Woods, 1992).
Cognitive Systems and Complexity
In Cognitive Systems Engineering concepts about cognition that were developed in simpler task
environments may be used to begin to chart more complex fields of human activity. But the
target is cognition in context which means a much greater emphasis on research techniques
honed for field or relatively high fidelity simulation settings. In more laboratory-like studies,
tasks must be modeled after naturally occurring ones; subjects must receive extensive practice
and possess significant domain knowledge; interface and support systems must be
representative of actual or proposed systems. There is an assumption that research results
derived from studies of simple situations will transfer directly to more complex situations.
However, simple situations may leave out parts of the problem solving process or
underestimate their importance. Furthermore, some aspects of problem solving may only
emerge when more complex situations are directly examined. Cognitive Systems Engineering
directly studies cognition in context.
2Hutchins, 1992, personal communication
The ultimate target of _tive Systems Engineering research is the domain practitioner. From
a practical point of view, what tools/resources can help him/her to be a better performer?
Usually this person will be experienced and domain knowledgeable. The usual distinction
between novice and expert is over simplistic. This means that Cognitive Systems Engineering
must use a different subject population than the typical subject of psychology experiments-
either experienced, domain knowledgeable practitioners, people who are similar to this group
(e.g., engineering graduate students who receive extensive practice at a highly realistic task
environment), or people who contrast practitioners on some important dimension (e.g.,
engineering staff may possess more detailed theoretical knowledge about a system than the
operational staff). 3
Artifacts and Tools
Cognitive Systems Engineering is sine qua non for human cognition with tools. Again, tools are
ubiquitous in real cognitive systems, and these tools influence the cognitive activities of
practitioners within a cognitive system. For example, cognitive science has shown repeatedly
that the representation of the problem provided to a problem solver can affect his, her or its task
performance (cL, Woods, in press for the implications of this for designing cognitive systems).
Thus, understanding cognitive systems means understanding how properties of artifacts and
representations influence and izansform cognitive activities (e.g., Hutchins, 1991).
Technology change is one of the driving forces for a cognitive systems approach. New
technology introduced for putative benefits in fact often introduces new demands and
complexities into already highly demanding fields of practice. Practitioners develop and use a
variety of strategies to cope with these new complexities. In other words, practitioners adapt
information technology provided for them to the immediate tasks at hand in a locally pragmatic
way, usually in ways not anticipated by the designers of the information technology (Roth et al.,
1987; Flores et al., 1988; Cook et al., 1990; Hutchins, 1990). While characteristics of artifacts
shape practitioner strategies, it is important to remember that tools are shaped by their users
(Woods et al., 1992). One of the goals of a cognitive systems approach is to understand how
practitioners, individually, as a group, and as operational organizations, shape artifacts to
function as cognitive tools.
The above means that research in this area must involve the availability of significant tools that
differ in relation to their impact on the practitioner's information processing resources and
strategies (Woods and Sarter, in press). The representations of the problem domain available to
the practitioner can degrade or support information processing tasks and strategies related to
task performance. Thus, there is an increasingly pressing need "... with developing a theoretical
base for creating meaningful artifacts and for understanding their use and effects" (Winograd,
1987, p.10), in other words, to develop a theoretical base for representation design in the
computer medium (woods, in press). Thus, we must confront the difficult problem of the
interaction and inter-dependence of investigations and design. Effective design depends on the
results of investigations of the cognitive activities in the field of practice. But how does one
utilize this information in design (a) when the new artifacts transform the cognitive system in
question potentially in radical ways and Co) while recognizing that design is an open-ended
3Note the use of the word participant rather than the traditional term of subject in recognition of
the need to be relevant to practitioners functioning in their field of activity.
process of discovering a space of possibilities that balance multiple interacting or competing
constraints on what would be useful?
STUDYING COGNITIVE SYSTEMS IN THE WILD
Research on problem solving in more complex situations, where significant tools are available to
support the human and where experienced domain knowledgeable people are the appropriate
study participants, requires a shift in research methodology from typical laboratory studies.
Natural history techniques (critical incidents, corpus building, direct observation 'in situ,'
elicitation of practitioner descriptions) are an important element for identifying and abstracting
the phenomena of joint cognitive systems. Cognitive simulation is a tool that can help model
data about these phenomena and to stimulate more directed studies (Woods and Roth, in press).
"Field experiments' investigate cognitive systems in scaled worlds shaped by (but not created
by) the investigators, where the situation where behavior is under investigation is seen as a
particular instance of a larger class of related situations over which the results can be
generalized (Woods, 1992).
These techniques do not mean that rigor or control or generalizability always must be sacrificed
to the goal of relevance. Rather it assumes that there are research approaches that can achieve
both generalizability and relevance. If we abandon methodological imperialism and adopt a
wide set of research tools, then we can identify recurring phenomena involving joint cognitive
systems and converge on an understanding of the factors involved in these phenomena
including how to control the phenomenon (i.e., how properties of artifacts, automation or
support systems exacerbate it and other types eliminate or reduce it).
A common complaint in cognitive psychology is that the research is driven too much by
experimental paradigms or procedures (e.g., dual task studies, the Sternberg paradigm). A
parallel common complaint in human-computer interaction is that research is driven too much
by the current technology (the current example in a long history is the question of tiled versus
overlapping windows). Similarly, research in developing machine cognitive systems
(automation, intelligent systems) has been framed in terms of the technologies from which the
systems are built. For example, knowledge engineering techniques are usually described in
terms of the syntax of computational mechanisms, i.e., the language of implementation is used
as a cognitive language. As a result, questions about what would be effective assistance are
displaced either to whomever selects the computational mechanisms or to the domain expert
who enters knowledge. A cognitive systems approach directly attacks the question of what
would be useful as a necessary complement to technology driven approaches.
If the context bound, cognitive systems approach is to succeed, it must meet several challenges
that go beyond past efforts in work analysis (De Keyser, 1990) or ethnography: (a) methods and
results for building models of how joint and distributed cognitive systems function in fields of
practice, (b) methods and theory building to generate generalizable results from context bound
studies (producing distilled results transportable across scenarios, participants and domains
rather than just diluted motherhood generalizations), (c) methods and theories to stimulate
critical growth of knowledge across specific context bound studies, (d) establish the
complementary link between growing the research base and using it in the process of design of
cognitive artifacts to enhance the performance of operational systems. If we can achieve this
complementarity between what is usually seen as separate domains of basic and applied work,
then we can "ascend to the particular.'
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Pilot Interaction With Cockpit Automation:
OperaUonal Experiences with the Flight Management System z
Nadine B. Sarter and David D. Woods
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
The Ohio State University
ABSTRACT
Because of recent incidents involving glass-cockpit aircraft, there is growing concern
with cockpit automation and its potential effects on pilot performance. However, little is
known about the nature and causes of problems that arise in pilot-automation
interaction. In this paper, we report the results of two studies that provide converging,
complementary data on pilots' difficulties with understanding and operating one of the
core systems of cockpit automation, the Flight Management System (FMS). A survey
asking pilots to describe specific incidents with the FMS and observations of pilots
undergoing transition training to a glass cockpit aircraft served as vehicles to gather a
corpus on the nature and variety of FMS-related problems. The results of both studies
indicate that pilots become proficient in standard FMS operations through ground
training and subsequent line experience. But even with considerable line experience,
they still have difficulties tracking FMS status and behavior in certain flight contexts,
and they show gaps in their understanding of the functional structure of the system. The
results suggest that design-related factors such as opaque interfaces contribute to these
difficulties which can affect pilots' situation awareness. The results of this research are
relevant for both the design of cockpit automation and the development of training
curricula specifically tailored to the needs of glass cockpits.
INTRODUCTION
There is growing concern with the potential effects of increasing levels of cockpit
automation on pilots' performance. These effects seem to be related to the fact that
automation changes the nature of the pilot's role on the flight deck. Pilots become
system managers who are monitoring systems and who intervene only when changes
are necessary or unanticipated situations occur (Billings, 1991). Instead of handflying the
airplane, pilots act indirectly through instructions to the automation in order to control
the aircraft. This may remove the pilot from the loop decreasing system awareness,
especially if feedback on automation status and behavior is limited.
Despite the growing interest in pilot-automation interaction, only limited empirical data
are available about the nature of problems that occur with the current generation of
automated cockpit systems. Pilot reports to the Aviation Safety Reporting System
, 1
IPaper appeared in The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), pp. 303-321, 1992.
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(ASRS) have been analyzed but these data are limited to a subset of incidents that were
severe enough to threaten safety (e.g. Eldredge et al., 1991). Some analyses of selected
incidents have been conducted (e.g. Norman, 1990) in the context of larger theoretical
treatments of human-automation interaction. Questionnaire techniques have been used
to obtain ratings about glass cockpit pilots' attitudes and opinions concerning current
cockpit automation (e.g. Wiener, 1989; Lyall, personal communication2; James et al.,
1991; "Automation Comment", 19913 ). While these rating data provide interesting
suggestions, they do not reveal the dynamics of pilot-automation interaction or specific
areas of difficulty. Also, these pilot opinion data would be more informative if they
were complemented by observational data.
We utilized two complementary approaches to obtain data about pilot-interaction with
one of the core systems of cockpit automation, the Flight Management System (FMS). In
one study, we asked pilots to describe in detail problems or incidents that they had
experienced with the FMS, especially ones where FMS behavior surprised them. The
corpus of incidents generated by this self-report technique was analyzed to identify the
nature of pilot difficulties and the flight contexts in which they occurred.
In a second study, we observed crews transitionJng to a glass cockpit aircraft during a
number of line-oriented simulation (LOS) on a fixed-base simulator. Pilot-FMS
interaction and crew-instructor communications during and after the simulated
scenarios were analyzed to identify difficulties in pilot-FMS interaction. The two studies
are complementary because they use different "corpus gathering" techniques, and
because they sample both experienced glass cockpit pilots and experienced pilots in
transition to a glass cockpit aircraft.
The results of this research add to a better understanding of the effects of flight deck
automation on pilot performance. This data may be helpful in the design of future flight
decks by pointing at specific sources of difficulty such as poor feedback on automated
system status and behavior. The results can also be used to refine and expand training
programs for glass cockpit aircraft. They provide information on specific FMS modes,
functions, and flight situations where pilot-FMS interaction is most troublesome.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The following section provides a brief, simplified overview of the Flight Management
System (FMS). The FMS supports pilots in a variety of tasks such as flight planning,
navigation, performance management, and flight progress monitoring. One of its major
functions, and the function of primary interest in the context of the reported studies, is
automatic flight path control.
The major FMS controls in the cockpit are the Mode Control Panel (MCP) and the
multifunction keyboards of two Control Display Units (one for each pilot). FMS-related
cockpit displays are the CDU multifunction display, two Attitude Director Indicators
(ADD, and two Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSI). Figure I illustrates the typical
2 Beth LyaU, America West Airlines, 1991.
3Automation comment. (1991, February). Feedback, No.23 pp. 2-5.
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location of these different FMS components within a generalized glass cockpit.
O I'lPll _, ;odnn,dva Ikud_
Flight deck controls and displays related to pilot-FMS intm-action within a
generalized glass cockpit
The Control Display Units (CDU) consist of a multifunction control unit (keyboard) and
data display. The keyboard is used by pilots to enter data that define a flight path and to
access flight-relate! data available on various pages within the CDU page architecture.
The pilot-entered flight path, continuously updated to reflect the current flight status, is
presented on the map display of the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI). This allows
pilots to monitor progress along the path. In the HSI Plan Mode, the pilot can visually
check modifications to the active flight plan.
The Mode Control Panel is used to activate different automatic flight modes (e.g.
VNAV, I.NAV, HDG SEL, LVL CHG). The pilot can also use knobs on the MCP to dial
in targets for individual flight parameters (airspeed, heading, altitude, and vertical
speed) which are tracked by the system if a corresponding automatic flight mode is
activated. To find out which FM5 modes are currently active, the pilot can monitor the
Flight Mode Annunciations on the Attitude Director Indicator (ADD. These provide
data on the active (or armed) pitch and roll modes and on the status of the autopilot(s).
They also indicate the status and mode of the autothrottles which can be set to manual
or automatic mode for speed and altitude control. The various FM5 interfaces and
aumflight functions provide the pilot with a high degree of flexibility in terms of
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selecting and combining levels of automation to respond to different situations and
requirements.
It is important to remember that there are various modes of automatic flight control that
range between the extremes of automatic and manual. The highest level of automatic
control occurs in the VNAV (Vertical Navigation) and LNAV (Lateral Navigation)
mode. In these modes of control, the pilots enter (or, in their words, "program") a
sequence of targets that define an intended flight path into the CDU, and then activate
the automatics by selecting VNAV (Vertical Navigation) and/or LNAV (Lateral
Navigation) through controls on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). The Flight
Management Computer (FMC) automatically controls the aircraft to follow the desired
flight path. At this strategic level of automation, the FMS pursues a sequence of target
values without the need for further intervention by the pilot. This is particularly helpful
in situations that allow for long-term planning with a low likelihood of deviations from
the plan (e.g. cruise phase of flight).
When the pilot needs to quickly intervene and change flight parameters (e.g. in terminal
areas), other lower levels of automation are available. The pilot can enter target values
for different flight path parameters (i.e. airspeed, heading, altitude, vertical speed) on
the Mode Control Panel (MCP). He then activates one of the corresponding modes (e.g.
Heading Select or Level Change), and the target will be captured and maintained
automatically until target or mode of control are actively changed by the pilot.
An important characteristic of automatic flight path control is the high degree of
dynamism. Transitions between modes of control occur in response to pilot input and to
changes in flight status. Automatic mode changes can occur automatically when a target
value is reached (e.g. when leveling off at a target altitude) or based on protection limits
(i.e. to prevent or correct pilot input that puts the aircraft into an unsafe configuration).
Both the flexibility of the FMS and the dynamism of flight path control impose cognitive
demands on the pilot. He has to decide which level and mode of automatic control to
use in a given set of circumstances, and he also has to track the status and behavior of
the automation. This latter task requires that he attends to and integrates data from a
variety of indications in the cockpit such as the Flight Mode Annunciations on the
Attitude Director Indicator, the visualization of the programmed route of flight on the
Horizontal Situation Indicator, or the display of target values on the Mode Control
Panel.
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
Study 1: Pilot Reports of FMS-Related Surprises
Backoround and Methods
The pilot report corpus was generated through a questionnaire, distributed to
experienced airline pilots flying the B-737-300. This survey expands on results from a
portion of a study by Wiener (1989) who asked B-757 pilots to rate statements
concerning their attitude towards cockpit automation. Two of the statements were
specifically related to FMS operations (see Figure 2).
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11. In the B-757 automation, there are still]
things that happen that suprise me. /
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Resultsof a pilotsurvey concerning"glasscockpit"-relatedissues(adopted
from Wiener, 1989,p.28 and 58).
(PhaseI = data collectedin1986;Phase 2 = data collectedin 1987;volunteer
757 pilots served as subjects).
Interestingly, the responses show that a rather large nuraber of pilots with more than
one year of experience on the B-757 agree that they are still being surprised by the
automation (~ 55% of the pilots) or that they do not understand all of the FMS modes
and features (- 20% of the pilots). Given the implications and potential consequences of
these rating data, it seems important to examine in detail what are the nature and
circumstances of these surprises and gaps in pilots' mental models. We followed up
Wiener's results by asking 13-737-300 pilots to rate their agreement/disagreement with
the above two statements on a five point scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree,
strongly disagree). But more critically, we asked them to describe in detail as many
instances as possible of surprises they had actually experienced and modes they did not
understand. The survey vehicle thus served as a "corpus gathering" technique, that is, a
means for "the identification and description of naturally occurring phenomena"
(Reason, 1990). In other words, it captured some of the variety of real-world difficulties
and recurrent patterns of pilot-automation interaction.
Reso.s
Table 1 summarizes the background data on the pilots who responded to the survey.
The survey was distributed to 887 13-737-300 line pilots from one airline company;
responses were received from 135 pilots.
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Table 1. Background and flight experience of pilots responding to the survey.
Age (n=134): 42.6 (8.5) y/o [mean (stO. clev.)]
Flight Time on the B-737-300 (n.132):
944 (613) hrs [mean (std. dev.)]
Seat on the B-737-300 (n-134):
Ca(_tain 75 pilots59 pilots
Total Flying Time (n=134):
7714 (4976) hrs [mean(stcl.aev)l
Previous Commercial Jet Aircralt Flown (n= t 24):
B 727 38 B 757/767 18
B 737-200 19 B 747-400 t
DC - 8 16
B 747 2 DC - 10 29
DC - 9 1
The pilots' ratings of the two statements on cockpit automation basically replicate
Wiener's (1989) results.
Table 2.Percenta_.=s of pilots' responses to the first statement "in the B-737-300
automation, there are stig things that happen that surprise me."
RATING
AGRF_
N_JI'RAL
DISAGREE
STRONGLY
DISAGRE]B
ALL
(1'4-135)
18
49
22
< !.200 lat.q
OF IJNB
EXI_ERIIg_K_
(N,,_)
22
57
5
14
2
>/- 1,2:ooHLq
OF L,B%_
(1_37)
33
11
43
NO I=_KVK)US
G_ COCKPIT
EXPBCI_CIE
(N=.IO4)
"/2
"/
21
PREVIOUS G_
COCIGPIT
_CIE
(N=,Ig)
42
53
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Table 3.Percentages of pilots' responses to the second statement "I'here are still modes
and features of the B-737-3(X) FMS that I don't understand."
RATING
STRONGLY
AGREE
AGREE
NEUTRAL
ALL PLOTS
(N,.135)
12
33
16
< i.,_o I.IR_
OF l..l_
r_(PERIEN_
(N_7)
15
36
21
>4- !,21_ tW.S
OF l._rl_
EX]'ER_NCE
(N-3"/)
25
DISAGREE 25 20 39
s'rtoNGtx
DISAGREE 14 8 28
NO PREVIOUS
GLASS COCKPff
_CE
(N.IO4)
54
13
33
PREVIOUS
GLASs COCKPIT
E)O_RENCE
(N=ig)
II
21
68
More important for the purpose of developing countermeasures to any existing
problems related to pilot-automation interaction are pilots' descriptions of spedfic
instances of FlvlS surprises and modes/features that they had difficulties with.
Comus of Pilot Reported FMS Sumdses and Problematic FMS Mode_JFeatum_
Pilots were asked to describe instances where FMS behavior surprised them and to
indicate modes/features of _ operation that they did not understand. There were no
sharp boundaries between the inddents elicited by the two questions. Pilot reports are
categorized according to their underlying theme. The major categories refer to a)
Vertical Navigation (VNAV) modes, b) data entry, c) uncommanded mode transitions,
d) infrequently used modes and features of the FMS, e) surprising flight director
commands, f) monitoring of active target values, g) the availability of multiple methods
for achieving a goal, h) the lack of data propagation within the control display unit
(CDU), and i) the effects of partial system failures. For each category in the corpus we
provide a short description of the kinds of problems reported, the number of pilot
reports on problems in this category, and, for some categories, an abbreviated example.
Surprises or unclear features of the FMS that were only reported by one pilot are not
included in the corpus.
A_ VNAV-related ombler_
The largest number of reported problems refer to Vertical Navigation Modes (VNAV).
These are subdivided into the four categories "VNAV logic and calculations", "Switching
between VNAV and MCI' descent modes", the "VNAV Speed Descent mode in general",
and the "Disengagement of the APPROACH mode".
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VNAV logic and calculations 38 Reports
Pilots indicate that the algorithms underlying the calculation of a VNAV path are not
transparent to them. They can not visualize the intended path, and therefore they are
sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain
target parameters (25 reports). VNAV control actions are often described as being
surprisingly abrupt (4 reports). Several pilots report that they have been surprised by
VNAV when it failed to start the descent upon reaching the top-of-descent point (TOD)
(9 reports).
Abbreviated example:
VNAV was used for a path descent. Although the displayed TOD was reached, and
autothrottles (A/Ts), autopilot (A/P) and VNAV were engaged, the aircraft did not
start to go down. The pilots finally figured out that this happened because they had not
changed their initial cruise altitude entry in the CDU after ATC told them to level off at
FL 290 instead of the originally planned FL 310. Meanwhile, the TOD point had been
passed. The airspeed had rolled back from 280 kts to 190 kts. When the descent was
initiated by the pilots, the FMC (Flight Management Computer) used an excessive rate
of descent (6,000 fpm) to get down to the path. This caused an ATC alert, and the actual
airspeed increased to the maximum limit speed.
Switching between VNAV and MCP descent modes ll_pom
These examples refer to situations where pilots had a descent properly programmed
and both VNAV (Vertical Navigation mode) and LNAV (Lateral Navigation mode)
engaged when ATC asked them for an unanticipated level-off or change in heading.
They report uncertainty as to whether or not the reengagement of VNAV after
compliance with the clearance by means of MCP interventions would bring them "oack
on track". They have problems with keeping track of active target values related to
different FMS subsystems under such circumstances.
VNAV Speed Descent Mode in general 8 Reports
Pilots indicate that they do not understand how the VNAV Speed Descent works in
terms of its targets, protections, and its operational logic.
Disengagement of the Approach (APPR) mode 6 reports
Some pilots report that they were not able to disengage the APPR mode when required
to do so. This problem is especially important as it occurs at a fairly low altitude, under
time pressure and sometimes in congested traffic areas.
Example:
During the final descent, the pilots were unable to deselect the APPR mode after
localizer and glideslope capture when ATC suddenly requested that the aircraft
maintain the current altitude and initiate a 90 degree left turn for spacing. They tried to
select ALT HOLD (Altitude Hold mode) and HDG SEL (Heading Select mode) on the
MCP to disengage the APPR mode and comply with the dearance but neither mode
would engage and replace the APPR mode. They finally turned all autoflight systems
off.
17
54reports
Therewasa largenumberof reportsrelated to the rejection of attempted input into the
CDU due to different software versions running on the FMS. While the survey was
underway, three slightly different FMS software versions were in use. According to the
reports, this resulted most frequently in unsuccessful attempts to enter a new crossing
restriction during the approach because the required data entry format and procedure is
not the same for the three software versions. Pilots also commented that the "Invalid
Entry" message they received in these cases did not help them find the correct input
format. These data entry problems frequently occurred when the pilots were working
under time pressure, and in some cases they contributed to altitude violations.
C_ Ullcomrpanded Mode Transitions 28 reports
Pilots report that they are surprised by "uncommanded" mode transitions which occur
upon reaching a target state or for protection purposes. Most often, the reports refer to
the automatic reversion from Vertical Speed mode (V/S) to Level Change mode (LVL
CHG) which occurs ff the airspeed deviates from the target range due to an excessive
rate of climb or descent. One potential consequence of this automatic mode transition is
that the vertical rate changes dramatically without any intervention by the crew. Pilots'
reports seem to indicate that such uncommanded changes are difficult to track given
current cockpit displays and indications.
D_,Infreouentlv used features/modes 14 reports
Pilots report that they do not understand modes and features of the FMS that they
rarely use (e.g. the Required Time of Arrival (RTA) feature). However, they also
comment that they do not think of these as critically important features.
E_ Fli_ohtDirector fFD_ Bars 11 reports
Pilots describe cases where the FD bars commanded pitch attitudes which _emed to be
inadequate or unnecessarily abrupt. Some pilots report that, as a result, they loose
confidence in the FD bars.
Active Tamer Values 10 reports
In some situations, it seems to be difficult for pilots to keep track of what are the
currently active target values. The pilot reports indicate that one of the major sources of
this problem is the interaction between the values selected on the MCP and those
selected within the CDU. Pilots also commented that, while the MET targets can
immediately be seen on the MCP, the FMS targets are sometimes "hidden" in the CDU
page architecture.
Example:
As a protective measure, VNAV dimbs and descents are constrained by the selected
MCP altitude. For example, in order for a preprog1_ FMC descent to begin upon
reaching the TOD point, a lower than CRZ altitude has to be selected on the MET. If
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pilotsforgetto doso,theaircraftwill maintaincruisealtitudebeyondthe TOD and the
airspeed will slow down. Some pilots report that they have been surprised by this
aircraft behavior because they did not realize that in this case the MCP target overrides
.the CDU target.
GI Multiole Methods 10 reports
Some pilots mention that, for certain tasks, there seems to be an overwhelming number
of possible methods to do the job. Their reports indicate that there is a cognitive load
associated with learning and deciding on which method to use for a particular task in a
particular flight context. The reports point to the tradeoff between providing pilots with
flexibility and imposing additional cognitive load on them.
HI Lack of data omoaaation 9 reports
Pilots report that they are sometimes surprised by the effects of interactions between
target values entered on different but interrelated CDU pages. They suggest that certain
data should propagate automatically to functionally interrelated CDU pages.
Example:
A frequently described example is the case where, during the cruise phase of flight, the
airspeed entry on the CRZ page of the CDU is changed but the new data do not
propagate to the DES page. If the new cruise speed is lower than the originally
programmed descent speed pilots are surprised upon reaching the TOO point, when the
aircraft starts to accelerate rather than decelerate.
II The effects of partial system failures 3 reports
These pilots report that they are unsure of the consequences of partial FMS failures.
After such failures, they can not tell which subsystems are still active, which subsystems
are available, or how the failure may interact with the active flight control mode. These
reports implicate potential problems with both pilots' mental model of the FMS
slracture and with the indications of FMS status and behavior.
The corpus of reported difficulties in pilot-FMS interaction was generated through one
technique that sampled a small part of the relevant user population. In order to
converge on a more comprehensive and meaningful assessment of existing difficulties in
pilot-automation interaction we conducted a complementary study where we observed
crews in transition to highly automated aircraft during a number of simulated flight
scenarios.
Study 2: Observation of Crews in Transition Training
Backoround and Methods
To complement the data gathered through pilot reports, we also observed the behavior
of experienced pilots who were in the process of transitioning to the B-737-300 aircraft.
This transition training involves classroom, computer-based training (CBT), LOS (line-
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orientedsimulation) sessions on a fixed-base trainer, and LOFT (line-oriented flight
training) sessions on full-mission simulators. At the end of training, pilots take a 4-hr
simulator check-ride in wh/ch they have to demonstrate that they are proficient in the
following autoflight systems operations: Active Data Base Check, FMS and Performance
Initialization, Flight Plan Entry, Direct To/Intercept Leg To, Holding Pattern, Installing
an Approach, Closing a Route Discontinuity, and MCP (Mode Control Panel) Speed
Interventions.
We observed 10 pilot crews during fifteen LOS sessions with 6 different scenarios
during their transition training on a fixed-base B-737-300 trainer (see Table 4 for a
breakdown of crews by scenario).
Observed training sessions on the FM_part task trainer.
LOS
(line-Oriented
Simulation)
Scenario
LOS 2
LOS 3
LOS 4
LOS 5
LOS 6
LOS 7
No. of
Observations
1
2
3
1
4
4
Crew
A
BC
D E
B D E
F
F
FG HI
Crews A, C, G, H, I, and K were observed only during one of the seven LOS sessions.
The other four crews were observed more than once. For example, crew B was
observed early in their training (session 3) and again during tier last LOS session. The
advantage of multiple observations is that the progress of these crews could be
examined.
The transition training is carried out using a fixed-base simulator which allows for all
flight operations except hand-flying the aircraft below 1,000 ft ACL. It is equipped with
all relevant cockpit instruments and displays including a Flight Management System
with its associated electronic flight displays and control interfaces described earlier
(Figure I).
Each of the observed LOS sessions requires 3 hours to complete. As in line operations,
one of the pilots is assigned the role of pilot-flying, the other carries out the tasks of the
pilot-not-flying. From time to time, the simulation is interrupted by the instructor to ask
questions or to discuss the flight situation with the pilots.
The simulation scenarios consist of a complete flight, including cockpit setup, takeoff
and landing, and they are designed to cover predefined sets of objectives emphasizing
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FMSoperations.Abnormalandincreasinglydifficult situationssuchassystemfailures
areintroducedatthelaterstagesof training.
Throughout each LOS session, an observer was present (the first author) who was
knowledgeable about both the scenarios and the FMS procedures and activities required
to handle each scenario.
The observer collected two types of data. First, she encoded crew-FMS interactions - the
methods used to carry out given tasks and errors or difficulties that occurred. A second
source of data was the discussion between the instructor and the crew which occurred
during the scenario and after the scenario was completed. These instructor-crew
communications help to revealgaps in FMS-relatedknowledge and misconceptionsin
the pilots'model of the system. For example, the discussionsindicatedwhether the
pilotswere capableofexplainingtheirinteractionwith the FMS, or whether theysimply
used "recipes"tooperatethe system without fullyunderstanding how theirinput lead
tothe desiredoutcome.
The LOS scenarioson thefixed-basedsimulationfacilityprovide a meaningful window
on pilot-automationinteraction.They allow for the collectionof verbal reportsas
frequentand extended interruptionsnaturallyoccur to answer pilots'questionsand to
comment on theirperformance (Woods, 1992).Such interventionsare not desirablein
thecontextofreal-timefull-missionsimulationtraining.
Resu,s
Table 5 contains the flight background of the ten crews. Note that 6 of the 10 observed
crews were "mixed crews" in the sense that one of the pilots had previous "glass-
cockpit" experience while the other one came from a "non glass-cockpit."
Table2. Previous aircraft flown by pilots observed during transition training.
Clew
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
K
Captain First Officer
B 767 B 727
B 767 B 767
DC - 10 B 727
B 767 DC - 8
B 767 B 727
B 767 B 727
B 767 B 727
B 767 B 727
DC - 8 B 727
DC- 10 DC-8
The observations indicated that pilots can become proficient in basic FMS operations in
a fairly short amount of time. Difficulties with these basics were observed only, with
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very few exceptions,during the first three training sessions(LOS 2, 3, 4). The few
difficulties observed concerned basics such as entering data in the correct format,
finding relevant data in the CDU pages, or carrying out tasks such as FMS Initialization.
During these first 3 sessions, it was, in some cases, difficult for pilots to keep track of
who is in charge and what are the currently active target values. Difficulties arose in
managing the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI), i.e., selecting ranges and modes of
presentation.
During the last three training sessions (LOS 5, 6, 7), pilot errors and questions focused
on gaps in their understanding of the underlying functional structure of the FMS. Table
6 provides an overview of the most frequently encountered problems and questions.
Table 6. Most frequently observed problems during transition training to the B-737-300.
Availability/Disengagement of Modes
For examl)ie" Know_:lge o! LNAV capture criteria ot ways to
disengage me APPR mode
- Keeping track of Uncommanded ModeTransitions
For example" Awareness of automatic transition to ALl" HOlD mode
upon level-off, and subsequenl requirement to re-engage a
Climb-Mocle Ior cl_anoing aJtitucle
- VNAV Targets and Logic
For example: Visualization of FMS-calculated vemcaJ prolile
- Multiple Methods
For example: Pilots often indicated that thsy were not sure whether
_ere were other ways of achiev:ng a goat or how to choose among
mulliple methoas
Frequently, pilots were able to describe FMS behavior during standard operations. For
example, a pilot could describe the states and activities of the autothrottles (A/Ts)
during takeoff and climb. But the same pilot would have difficulties applying this
knowledge to a specific and more complicated operational situation, e.g. an aborted
takeoff. This is often referred to as the problem of inert knowledge (Glaser, 1984).
In summary, the physical appearance and the "recipes" for carrying out standard tasks
could be learned in a fairly short amount of time. However, even during the last training
sessions, many of the observed pilots show gaps in their understanding of the overall
functional structure of the system as indicated by their problems in dealing with
complex or novel tasks and situations. The above problems were most often seen with
pilots who transitioned from a "non-glass cockpit" aircraft. While their "glass-
experienced" colleagues "only" had to get used to minor differences between theb
previous aircraft and the B-737-300, these pilots had to learn a whole new cockpit
concept.
22
As a result,it appearsfrom our observations that there are disadvantages to "mixed"
training crews, i.e. crews where only one of the two pilots has previous glass-cockpit
experience. This pilot who could focus on deeper issues about how to manage the
automation capabilities in diverse contexts often was forced to wait while the other crew
member explored more basic concepts and flight situations. In turn, the pilot with no
previous experience on a highly automated aircraft sometimes did not ask all of his
questions because he felt that he was slowing down the training process.
Overall, we observed the same kinds of difficulties during the late stages of transition
training as were reported by line pilots in the survey study. The two studies used
complementary data collection techniques (pilot reports and behavioral data through
observation of training simulations) and sampled different levels of experience with
glass cockpit aircraft. The combined results create a corpus of specific flight situations
and FMS behaviors where difficulties arise in pilot-automation interaction. At this level,
the results may be useful to system designers interested in incremental improvements of
the current system and its pilot interfaces. Similarly, the results may be useful to those
responsible for training pilots to work with current cockpit automation by highlighting
particular modes of the FMS and particular flight situations where pilots have difficulty
tracking and anticipating FMS behavior. However, one may also interpret the specific
reported and observed difficulties in a larger perspective - what do these results tell us
about the factors that are important for effective human-automation cooperation?
DISCUSSION
Breakdowns in Pilot-Automation Interaction
The corpus of reported and observed difficulties provides a picture of the kinds of
complexities that can arise in pilot-automation interaction and the kinds of task contexts
where these complexities can affect performance. Knowledge of these mechanisms is
essential to be able to better design the interface between pilots and automation from the
point of view of a cooperative human-machine cognitive system (Woods, 1986;
Hutchins, 1991). This knowledge also indicates how training programs may need to
change in fundamental ways to accomodate the changes in the human's role in highly
automated aircraft.
The corpus of reported and observed difficulties indicates that pilots can lose situation
awareness (Sarter and Woods, 1991) with respect to FMS status and behavior. Wiener
(1989) has summarized his results on cockpit automation in the phrase, "the three most
commonly asked questions in glass cockpits are: 'What is it doing?' 'Why did it do that?'
'What will it do next?'" The corpus reveals specific pilot-FMS interaction difficulties that
can be grouped under these three questions. For example, difficulties in tracking active
target values and FMS behavior in some modes can contribute to losing track of "what
the automation is doing". Uncommanded mode transitions can create situations where
the crew can be surprised - "why did it do that?" One common factor contributing to
such an incomplete or faulty assessment of system status and behavior seems to be
weak feedback from the FMS displays and interfaces (Norman, 1990). Another common
factor implicated in many of the problems noted in the corpus is incomplete or buggy
mental models of how various modes of the FMS work and especially how they interact
with each other in different flight contexts. If the pilot has difficulty monitoring and
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understandingautomaticsystembehavior,it will alsobe difficult for him to project or
anticipate future states - "what will it do next".
The problem of weak feedback on system status and behavior is a common deficiency in
human-computer interfaces (Norman, 1990). While all of the necessary data on FMS
status may be available somewhere in the cockpit displays and the CDU page
architecture (see Figure 1), finding, integrating, and interpreting all of the relevant data
to build an assessment of current and future FMS behavior can be a demanding
cognitive task, especially given the time demands of actual flight operations (Woods,
1991). Many examples of inadequate feedback occurred in the corpus including
difficulties integrating data on FMS status distributed over different cockpit displays or
CDU pages, difficulties anticipating uncommanded mode changes, difficulties assessing
the implications of changes to the instructions given to the FMS (e.g., enroute changes in
cruise speed may interact with pre-programmed values for the descent phase on a
different CDU page), difficulties visualizing the descent profile programmed in VNAV.
Weak feedback can increase cognitive workload in several ways: by increasing demands
on pilots to remember information and by increasing the need to rely on mental models
of FMS structure and function to assess or project FMS behavior.
Another factor that seemed to contribute to difficulties noted in the corpus is incomplete
or buggy mental models of how various modes of the FMS work and how they interact
with each other in different flight contexts. The various FMS interfaces and autoflight
functions provide the pilot with a high degree of flexibility in terms of selecting and
combining levels of automation to respond to different situations and requirements.
However, this flexibility creates new sources of cognitive workload for the pilot. One
issue is simply that there are a large variety of ways that the automation can be used
and that having a detailed and complete understanding of how these various
automation modes work in detail is a demanding new knowledge requirement for the
glass cockpit pilot. The corpus results indicate that there are infrequently used modes
(e.g., VNAV speed descent is rarely used in US airspace) that pilots do not understand
completely. Second, the flexibility of the automation requires that pilots understand
how different modes interact and the consequences of transitions between modes in
various flight contexts. Third, the pilot needs to develop knowledge and strategies for
how to use the flexibility of the automation in different flight circumstances. The corpus
results indicate that pilots tend to adopt and stick with a small repertoire of strategies
because their knowledge about the advantages and disadvantages of the various
options for different flight contexts is incomplete.
Both the self-reports and the training observations indicate that pilots do not perceive
the FMS as one large integrated system consisting of a variety of closely related,
interacting subsystems such as the MCP or the CDU. They rather tend to refer to the
MCP as a separate system to which they "escape" in case things become too complex or
time pressure is too high while working with the CDU. From an engineering
perspective, the FMS works in an integrated way. But this property is not sufficiently
emphasized in training, and it is not dearly represented in the image the system
presents to the pilot through the various displays of FMS status. Our data show that
pilots think of and operationally use the MCP and CDU as, at least, two different
systems.
24
Discussionsof issueson pilot-automation interaction often focus on the transition from
automated to manual control of the aircraft. Our data show that the problematic issue is
in fact different. It is important to remember that there are various modes of automatic
flight control that range between the extremes of automatic and manual. The FMS
provides the pilot with the opportunity to select among and combine a wide variety of
modes which results in different levels of automation. The process of gradually moving
up and down between these levels of automation is where difficulties in managing the
system occur frequently due to problems with keeping track of the states and target
values of the various modes. This problem is aggravated by the fact that these
transitions are most likely to occur during busy climb and descent phases of flight.
New technology that creates or exacerbates bottlenecks during busy, high tempo, high
criticality, event-driven operations, while its benefits tend to occur during routine, low
workload situations has been termed "clumsy automation" (Wiener, 1988; 1989). Clumsy
automation or the clumsy use of technology is a form of poor coordination between the
human and the machine. The concept is based on the fact that in complex systems
human activity ebbs and flows, with periods of lower activity and more self paced tasks
interspersed with high tempo, externally paced operations where task performance is
more critical (Rochlin, et al., 1987). An important design feature for well integrated
cooperative work between the automation and the human is how the automation
supports high workload periods or more difficult tasks. As a result, the effects of factors
such as weak system feedback and incomplete mental models of the functional structure
of the FMS may only be visible during more difficult or unusual situations (Roth et al.,
1987).
The corpus of reported and observed difficulties show that, while pilots can make the
FMS work (e.g., by using familiar modes or by switching to less automated modes), they
are not always capable of explaining why their input resulted in the desired outcome. In
addition, they do not fully exploit the range of capabilities of the system. In case of
unusual or novel situations, it may be essential, however, to have a thorough
understanding of the functional structure of the FMS and to be able to use this
knowledge in an operationally effective way.
While some of this knowledge about how to manage the FMS capabilities is acquired
during training, initial operating experience, and line operations, our data from
experienced pilots show that there may not be enough time to explore all system options
or to figure out the reasons underlying surprises or unclear modes. Furthermore, since
the pilots can work around areas in which their knowledge may be buggy or which
occur infrequently, incentives for deepening their understanding of the FMS may
diminish with time. People are not always accurate in their judgments about how much
they know (the degree of calibration) and can overestimate how much they know (an
overconfidence bias), especially when the device in question has an opaque interface
that provides weak feedback about actual status and behavior.
The concept of dumsy automation reminds us that cognitive work in the automated
cockpit is inherently cooperative - between the human crew members and between the
pilots and the automation (Woods, 1986; Hutchins, 1991). Therefore, the fact that pilots
tend to adopt a limited repertoire of strategies for using the capabilities of the
automation creates a potential coordination problem. When two pilots with different
preferences have to coordinate their activities and crosscheck inputs without fully
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understandingthe strategies preferred or used by their colleague, they may have
problems to maintain situation awareness. Cooperation and coordination is also
necessary between the crew and the automation. Thus, for glass cockpit aircraft, cockpit
resource management training should be concerned with pilot-automation as well as
pilot-pilot coordination and communication.
An additional factor complicating pilot-automation cooperation is the difficult problem
of software configuration control. One can assume that software is not a static entity but
changes and evolves throughout the life of the system. Our results show that there are
operational consequences and design implications which should be taken into account
in managing software changes and that version control problems can be a source of
difficulties for the crew.
Implications for Design and Training
The corpus of reported and observed difficulties in pilot-automation interaction
suggests approaches to improving coordination and cooperation in current and future
systems. First, better feedback on FMS status and behavior can support pilots in
maintaining situation awareness in high tempo, high workload or unusual flight
contexts. One part of this may be to explore new concepts that help pilots integrate
diverse data into a coherent, operationally relevant picture of FMS status and behavior,
including past behavior, current activities and setup, and future implications (e.g.,
Woods, 1991). In addition, the pilot-FMS interfaces can be modified to support data
access and interface management tasks. Second, training programs and design efforts
can address new ways to support pilots in forming and refining their mental model of
the functional structure of the FMS.
The current training programs for pilots in transition to glass cockpits can provide pilots
with the basic knowledge required to "make the FMS work'; especially in standard
situations. However, the data In the corpus show that this training may not be sufficient
to prepare pilots for dealing with all operationally significant FlvlS procedures and
information for coping with non-standard situations. It may prove important to revise
our conception of training experienced pilots for transition to glass cockpit aircraft
where the initial training is one part of a longer, continuing learning process with
respect to how cockpit automation functions and how it can be utilized as a resource in
a wide range of operational circumstances. Training optxn-tunities for pilots flying glass
cockpits in line operations may need to be expanded to establish ongoing progressive
training through additional information about FMS features that are used less
frequently or that can not be tried out in line operations for safety reasons, through
opportunities to test and to extend their skills in managing the automation especially in
more difficult or unusual flight contexts, and through opportunities to follow up and
learn from surprises that they or their fellow pilots have experienced.
The FMS training that we observed emphasized a bottom-up approach oriented towards
profidency in specific tasks by providing "recipes" for system operation. The result that
most of the difficulties in the corpus involved non-standard situations ami complex
interactions of FMS subsystems seems to suggest that a top-down approach would be
desirable as an addition or complement. If pilots were provided with an overall mental
representation of the functional structure of the FMS, they would be better able to
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manageand utilize the automated systems in unusual or novel situations. Given that
their role has shifted towards the detection of deviations from the expected and towards
troubleshooting and managing such situations, this capability seems to be very
important for pilots in highly automated aircraft.
In summary, the corpus of observed and reported difficulties in pilot-automation
interaction suggests the need for the following improvements in the design and training
of the FMS to help pilots exploit the full range of capabilities provided by flight deck
automation:
- system states and transitions, goals, and options need to be dearly and coherently
indicated to the pilot;
- the user needs to be supported in forming an accurate mental model of the device
functionality which is critical for coping with more difficult and unusual flight
situations;
- the display and interaction capabilities that mediate pilot-FMS communication need to
be tailored to high demand situations and circumstances.
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ABSTRACT
Technological developments have made it possible to automate more and more functions on the
commercial aviation flight deck and in other dynamic high consequence domains. This increase in the
degrees of freedom in design has shifted questions away from narrow technological feasibility. Many
concerned groups from designers to operators to regulators and researchers have begun to ask
questions about how should we use the possibilities afforded by technology skillfully to support and
expand human performance. In this paper we report on an experimental study that addresses these
questions by examining pilot interaction with the current generation of flight deck automation. Previous
results on pilot-automation interaction derived from pilot surveys, incidents reports and training
observations that have produced a corpus of features and contexts where human-machine coordination
is likely to break down (e.g., automation surprises). We used these data to design a simulated flight
scenario that contained a variety of probes designed to reveal pilots' mental models of one major
component of flight deck automation, the Flight Management System (FMS). The events within the
scenario also were designed to probe pilot's ability to apply their knowledge and understanding in
specific flight contexts and to examine their ability to track the status and behavior of the automated
system (mode awareness). While pilots were able to "make the system work" in standard situations, the
results reveal a variety of latent problems in pilot-FMS interaction that can affect pilot performance in
non-normal time critical situations.
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of advanced technology to modern flight decks has succeeded in terms of increasing
the precision and efficiency of flight operations. However, recent accidents and incidents involving glass
cockpit aircraft have suggested that the current generation of cockpit automation may have created new
operational burdens and new kinds of failure modes in the overall human-machine system (Billings,
1991). Only a limited empirical data base is available concerning the nature and circumstances of
existing problems in pilot-automation interaction (Wiener, 1989; Eldredge, Dodd and Mangold, 1991;
James et al., 1991). These data consist primarily of either subjective data obtained from questionnaires
and interviews or of in-flight observations of pilot interaction with one of the core systems of cockpit
automation, the Flight Management System (FMS). The resulting data about pilots' attitude towards the
system and the anecdotal reports of problems indicate that there is a need for further research that
ISubmi_d for publication
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systematicallyanalyzesthenatureof and thereasonsfor FMS-relatedproblems.Theseresults win be
critical in order to develop countermeasures and to improve pilot-automation interaction.
With this goal in mind, we studied pilot-FMS interaction through three different methodological
approaches that allowed us to systematically collect converging data to describe existing problems and
to understand why they exist. In the first report on our work (Sarter and Woods, in press), tw_o
exploratory research activities were described. A survey of pilots' self-reports of their operational
experiences with the FMS and observations of transition training from a conventional to a "glass cockpit"
aircraft were used to gather a corpus of problems with the operation of the FMS. This corpus consisted
of detailed incident descriptions from which major underlying problem categories were extracted.
These categories provided the basis for the design of a scenario for an experimental study of pilots'
mental model and their awareness of the FMS. In this study we confronted twenty experienced pilots
with situations and tasks that are instances of the previously identified FMS-related problem categories.
The pilots flew the scenario on a part task training simulator that had been developed to teach FMS
operations. As a result, it was possible to test the completeness and accuracy of their FMS-related
knowledge as well as their ability to apply this knowledge in specific situations.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The following section provides a brief, simplified overview of the Flight Management System (FMS).
The FMS supports pilots in a variety of tasks such as flight planning, navigation, performance
management, and flight progress monitoring. One of its major functions, and the function of primary
interest in the context of the reported studies, is automatic flight path control.
The major FMS controls in the cockpit are the Mode Control Panel (MCP) and the multifunction
keyboards of two Control Display Units (one for each pilot). FMS-related cockpit displays are the CDU
multifunction display, two Attitude Director Indicators (ADD, and two Horizontal Situation Indicators
(HSI). Figure 1 illustrates the typical location of these different FMS components within a generalized
glass cockpit.
Figure 1.
v Flight deck controls and displays related to pilot-FMS interaction within a generalized
glass cockpit
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TheControlDisplayUnits (CDU) consist of a multifunction control unit (keyboard) and data display.
The keyboard is used by pilots to enter data that define a flight path and to access flight-related data
available on various pages within the CDU page architecture. The pilot-entered flight path, continuously
updated to reflect the current flight status, is presented on the map display of the Horizontal Situation
Indicator (HSI). This allows pilots to monitor progress along the path. In the HSI Plan Mode, the pilot
can visually check modifications to the active flight plan.
The Mode Control Panel is used to activate different automatic flight modes (e.g. VNAV, LNAV, HDG
SEL, LVL CHG). The pilot can also use knobs on the MCP to dial in targets for individual flight
parameters (airspeed, heading, altitude, and vertical speed) which are tracked by the system if a
corresponding automatic flight mode is activated. To find out which FMS modes are currently active,
the pilot can monitor the Flight Mode Annunciations on the Attitude Director Indicator (ADI). These
provide data on the active (or armed) pitch and roll modes and on the status of the autopilot(s). They
also indicate the status and mode of the autothrottles which can be set to manual or automatic mode for
speed and altitude control. The various FMS interfaces and autoflight functions provide the pilot with a
high degree of flexibility in terms of selecting and combining levels of automation to respond to
different situations and requirements.
It is important to remember that there are various modes of automatic flight control that range between
the extremes of automatic and manual. The highest level of automatic control occurs in the VNAV
(Vertical Navigation) and LNAV (Lateral Navigation) modes. In these modes of control, the pilots enter
(or, in their words, "program") a sequence of targets that define an intended flight path into the CDU,
and then activate the automatics by selecting VNAV (Vertical Navigation) and/or LNAV (Lateral
Navigation) through controls on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). The Flight Management Computer
(FMC) automatically controls the aircraft to follow the desired flight path. At this strategic level of
automation, the FMS pursues a sequence of target values without the need for further intervention by
the pilot. This is particularly helpful in situations that allow for long-term planning with a low likelihood
of deviations from the plan (e.g. cruise phase of flight).
When the pilot needs to quickly intervene and change flight parameters (e.g. in terminal areas), other
lower levels of automation are available. The pilot can enter target values for different flight path
parameters (i.e. airspeed, heading, altitude, vertical speed) on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). He then
activates one of the corresponding modes (e.g. Heading Select or Level Change), and the target will be
captured and maintained automatically until target or mode of control are actively changed by the pilot.
An important characteristic of automatic flight path control is the high degree of dynamism. Transitions
between modes of control occur in response to pilot input and to changes in flight status. Automatic
mode changes can occur automatically when a target value is reached (e.g. when leveling off at a target
altitude) or based on protection limits (i.e. to prevent or correct pilot input that puts the aircraft into an
unsafe configuration).
Both the flexibility of the FMS and the dynamism of flight path control impose cognitive demands on the
pilot. He has to decide which level and mode of automatic control to use in a given set of circumstances,
and he also has to track the status and behavior of the automation. This latter task requires that he
attends to and integrates data from a variety of indications in the cockpit such as the Flight Mode
Annunciations on the Attitude Director Indicator, the visualization of the programmed route of flight on
the Horizontal Situation Indicator, or the display of target values on the Mode Control Panel.
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METHODOLOGY
General Approach
The study was designed based on a phenomenon-driven ethnographic approach to studying cognitive
systems in high-tempo event-driven worlds (Woods, in press). First, we had to identify an experimental
environment for studying pilot-FMS interaction. It seemed important to account for the numerous
concurrent tasks that have to be carried out by the pilot in the real operational environment and that
may affect his FMS-related performance. Also, the impact of the high-tempo nature of flight had to be
captured to arrive at valid results. Therefore, a strict laboratory study with a restricted set of tools and
environmental fidelity was rejected. The other extreme on the scale of possible approaches, i.e. a high-
fidelity full-mission simulation study, was not selected because some of its inherent capabilities (e.g.
aircraft motion, outside view) were not essential for the purpose of this study and because there were
high costs associated with obtaining access to such facilities. As a result, we chose an environment that
allows for both realistic tools and tasks as well as for a fairly high level of fidelity - a part-task training
simulator for FMS operations.
The next important step in conceptualizing the study was designing the scenario based on predefined
phenomena of interest (Woods and Sarter, in press). This is much more than simply making the scenario
as realistic as possible. A realistic setting only provides the background on which the scenario needs to
be staged. In this study, the problem categories identified by our survey and the training observations
represented the phenomena of interest. The scenario design process involved identification of specific
tasks and events linked together in a coherent scenario that would probe these phenomena. This
approach enables the experimenter to trigger behavior of interest rather than hope for it to happen
accidentally. While this approach may underlie a large number of simulation studies, it is often not
explicitly laid out for the reader of a research report. In contrast, this paper will provide a detailed
description of the match between phenomena of interest and events within the simulated scenario.
The data collection included both verbal and behavioral reports. An observer knowledgeable about FMS
operations and about the test scenario kept track of pilots' interaction with the FMS on-line by means of
a data-collection sheet that laid out the possible trajectories of the scenario and pilot behavior. In
addition, pilots were asked to describe their reactions to hypothetical events which could not actu y
be simulated due to lime restrictions and about FMS-related knowledge In general. These questions
were asked in low workload phases of the flight without interrupting the simulation. This allowed us to
probe pilots' knowledge within the actual operational environment rather than questioning them out of
context where their task would be more related to the retrieval of information than to its application. A
few questions were asked before or after completion of the flight as they related to more general topics
or to preflight activities.
The data were collected throughout the experiment rather than extracted from video- and audio-
recordings of the simulation runs after the fact. Such recordings can be helpful for exploratory studies or
in cases where a knowledgeable observer is not available. But even though the retrospective analysis of
videotapes may sometimes reveal unexpected or previously unattended but interesting behavior, there
are disadvantages as well (e.g., investigators who are overwhelmed by the amount of data and unsure
ofhow toabstractbroaderresultsfrom allthedetails).In thiscasegettingactuallinepilotstovolunteer
toparticipateinthe study virtuallyruledout theuse of videotape(e.g.,gettingpractitionersand their
representatives, unions, to agree is prohibitively difficult). In addition, videotape is no substitute for
careful and detailed identification of what one is looking for based on the mapping between phenomena
of interest and the specific scenario; and videotape is no substitute for careful and detailed identification
of what one might expect as canonical behavior based on knowledge of the field of practice (Woods, in
press;Woods and Sarter,inpress).
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Experimental Scenario
The experimental scenario for this study was designed to address predefined phenomena of interest.
These phenomena had been identified by the corpus gathering activities (pilot survey and training
observations) preceding the study (see Sarter and Woods, in press). The issues were related to (a) pilots'
proficiency in standard tasks, (b) pilots' mental model of the functional structure of the FMS and (c) their
awareness of system state and behavior (mode awareness). In cooperation with a flight instructor, we
identified tasks and events that would best serve to probe these phenomena. The basic flight context
consisted of a flight from Los Angeles to San Francisco which took approximately 60 minutes to
complete 2.
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the mapping between phenomena of interest and
specific tasks and events within the scenario. Figure 2 illustrates the flight route and the liming of the
tasks and events throughout the scenario. In order to better understand the following description of the
scenario, it may be helpful for the reader who is not familiar with glass-cockpit technology to take a look
at the short introduction to the FMS that was provided in the first part of this paper.
"°..°
°°.°
The Timing of Scenario Tasks and Events along the Flight Route
2The actual flight time would be longer but temporary increases in the simulated aircraft speed were
used during quiescent phases of flight to reduce time on the simulator.
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Proficiency in Standard Tasks
Table 1 lists the standard tasks that pilots had to carry out in the course of the scenario. The previous
study (Sarter and Woods, in press) showed that pilots' proficiency at standard tasks did not seem to be a
major source of difficulties. It was included as part of this scenario to provide additional converging
evidence based on a scenario evolving in real time and involving pilots with line experience in glass
cockpits to confirm the previous results 3.
Table 1. Scenario Probes of Pilots' Proficiency in Standard FMS-Related Tasks
- Route Changes
- Intercepting a Radial
- Going direct to a waypoint
- Building and Executing a Hold
- Installing an ILS Approach
- Entering Crossing Restrictions
- Unplanned Level-Off
- Extending the Final Approach Fix
Pilots' Knowledoe Of The Functional Structure Of The System
The second phenomenon of interest is the pilots' knowledge of the functional structure of the FMS. By
functional structure of the FMS we are referring to their knowledge about how the FMS behaves in
different flight situations rather than their ability to simply recite facts about the FMS. For example, do
they understand the sequence of mode changes, their associated indications and the corresponding
aircraft behavior throughout the takeoff roll.
To probe this phenomenon of interest, we built into the scenario a variety of tasks and situations that
permit inferences about pilots" knowledge of the system and their ability to apply this knowledge in
actual task contexts. Knowledge of overall FMS functionality was subdivided into six subtopics, and
specific probes were developed for each subtopic (Table 2 summarizes the scenario probes).
A. Knowledae of the CDU Paae Amhitectum
The page architecture of the FMS control display unit contains a huge amount of data that may be
relevant at some point during the flight. Since only a very limited set of data can be presented on the
CDU screen at any given time, pilots need to be able to navigate through the "hidden" data space. To
find out about problems related to this task, pilots were asked to locate information on CDU pages on
the following topics:
- Single ensine capabilities
- Wind data for fixes of flight
- Available fuel
- Localizer Frequency and Front Course for a Runway
3The group of standard tasks presented in this experiment did not indude the FMCS/Performance
Initial/zation as we has already seen during the training observations that these tasks did not challenge
the pilots. Also, we wanted to focus on tasks that have to be performed in the dynamic airborne portion
of flight rather than on ground tasks that are not as much affected by time pressure or concurrent tasks.
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Wealsoaskedpilotsabouttheir expectationsconcerningdatapropagationthroughouttheCDUpage
architecture.After pilots had enteredspeedandaltitude target values on the Cruise Page to comply
with an amended clearance by ATC, we asked whether they expected these data to propagate to the
CDU Descent Page to become the targets for their descent.
These probes were supposed to test pilots' knowledge of the page architecture of the CDU as well as
their ability to use the CDU interface to call up information/pages.
B. Mode Availability - Mode Disenoan_ement
After being vectored off-course by ATC, pilots were asked to recapture the preprogrammed route. This
task was introduced to find out whether pilots were aware of the criteria that have to be met in order for
the LNAV mode to capture the original flight path.
When being cleared by ATC for the ILS approach, pilots were asked to properly set up the FMS to be
able to use the automatic APPROACH mode. They had to remember that a lower MCP altitude had to
be selected before engaging the APPROACH mode. Without this first step, the APPROACH mode
engagement would not result in the desired start of descent; rather, the FMS would control the aircraft
to maintain the MCP target altitude.
After Localizer and Glideslope capture on final descent, pilots were asked to describe how they would
disengage the APPROACH mode if ATC told them to change heading and altitude for traffic.
The above probes allow us to determine whether pilots are familiar with the general prerequisites and
procedures for engaging or disengaging a mode and whether they can apply this knowledge to a specific
flight context.
 _EME.La 
After takeoff from Los Angeles, pilots were asked to intercept the LAX 248 degree radial outbound. In
order to successfully perform this task using LNAV, the pilot had to understand that the FMS logic is to
always fly towards, not away from a waypoint. As his original flight plan did not include any waypoint
on the radial, he first had to create a fictitious fix somewhere on the radial that the FMS could fly to.
After completion of the flight, we asked pilots about functional characteristics of the VNAV Path
Descent in comparison to the VNAV Speed Descent. The questions referred to the way either one of
these types of descent is initialized, what control mode the system uses to maintain target speed in
either mode, and what is the lowest altitude that the system automatically descends to.
D. Effects of oartial system failures
During a descent, pilots were asked about the expected consequences of losing the autothrottles in that
situation. Would the aircraft still level off at target altitude, and what would be the consequences in
terms of airspeed ? How would they intervene in that case?
After capturing the glideslope, the glideslope was failed due to a signal loss. This allowed us to test
whether pilots would realize what happened, whether they would understand the implications of losing
the glideslope, and how they would react to the failure. In addition, they were asked about the
differences between a glidesiope failure above versus below 1,500 ft AGE
If the glideslope signal is lost above 1,500 ft, the G/S indicator and the F/D bars disappear from the
ADI, and the aircraft continues its descent at the current rate of descent. A flag indicating unreliable
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glideslopeinput appearsonly on thestandbyattitudeindicator. Glideslope loss below 1,500 ft (where
automatic system tests are conducted) results in both autopflots disengaging and in changes in the mode
indications (FLARE armed is not annunciated).
E,_Bazaa  s
While climbing to 5,000 ft with VNAV engaged, pilots were asked what other modes they could use for
the dimb. With respect to one of the possibilities, the V/S mode, they also were asked what happens if
an excessive rate of climb is used (i.e. the FMS automatically reverts to the LVL CHG mode to maintain
a safe airspeed).
F. Various Ootions for Carrvino Out a Task
Pilots were asked to comply with ATC dearances by using the FMS the same way as in real line
operations. Once they had decided to use a certain mode for a given task, they were asked about other
possible ways of achieving the same goal. This provided us with information on their knowledge about
options provided by the FMS as well as about their criteria for selecting modes under different
circumstances.
Table 2. Scenario Probes of Pilots' Knowledge of the Functional Structure of the FMS
- Locating data in the CDU page architecture
- Tracking data propagation within the CDU
- Applying knowledge about mode capture criteria
- Disengaging the automatic APPR mode after capturing localizer and glideslope
- Intercepting a radial outbound
- Questions concerning VNAV Speed versus VNAV Pathdescent
- Loss of autothrottles during a descent
- Loss of G/S signal / G/S failure
- Predicting effects of excessive rate of climb In V/S mode
- Describing the different possible ways of doing a task
Mode Awareness
Table 3 summarizes the probes built into the scenario for testing pilots' mode awareness. They help
determine whether pilots know who/which system is in charge of conta'olling the aircraft, what the
active target values are, and whether they can anticipate the status and behavior of the FMS.
WVho is in cham¢?"
Immediately before takeoff, pilots were asked how they would abort the takeoff if necessary at
approximately 40 kts with the autothrottles turned on. In order to adequately cope with the situation,
pilots have to understand what regime the autothrotties follow during takeoff. Until reaching 64 kts, the
autothrottles will automatically go to N1. At and above 64 kts, pilots can manually override the
autothrottles. Thus, if aborting the takeoff before 64 kts, the autothrottles have to be disengaged to
prevent them from advancing again to reach N1.
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Autothrottle Status, Behavior, and Indications throughout the Takeoff Roll
Pilots' awareness of active mode settings was also probed by checking whether they (re)activated a
corresponding mode after modifying target data in order to make the system work on reaching a new
target state.
"What are the active tamer values?"
Several probes were used to find out about pilots' awareness of the current FMS target values. Shortly
before takeoff, they were given an amended takeoff clearance involving a tailwind component. This
requires that they remember to change their N1 setting from reduced to full takeoff thrust.
During the cockpit setup, a pointer to the pilot-calculated N1 target value can be manually positioned on
the forward engine display for reference purposes. However, if the autothrottles are active during
takeoff, as in this scenario, they use the FMS-calculated N1 target which is shown on the CDU Takeoff
Reference page. To probe pilots' awareness of the relevant N1 value, the instructor manually positioned
the N1 pointer on the engine display to a different value than the one indicated on the FMS-CDU. Pilots
were asked which of the two values would be the target for the autothrottles during takeoff.
During an intermediate climb, the pilot-not-flying activated the CONTROL WHEEL STEERING (CWS)
pitch mode by pulling on the yoke, thus overriding the active LVL CHG pitch. The CWS pitch mode
maintains the vertical rate that corresponds to the pilot-induced yoke position. The pilot-flying had to
determine whether the aircraft would still level off at the target altitude that had been preselected on the
Mode Control Panel for the LVL CHG mode.
Anticioation of system status and behavior
Whenever transitions in aircraft behavior were imminent (e.g. level-off at a target altitude), the
participants were asked what flight mode annunciations they expected to see on the ADI throughout
the transition.
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Table 3. Scenario Probes of Pilots' Mode Awareness
- Aborted Takeoff below 64 kts
- Frequent changes in clearances involving mode transitions
- Tailwind in takeoff clearance
- Incorrect N1 manual setting
- Activation of CWS during climb
- Ask for predictions of ADI mode indications
Study Participants
The participants in this study were 20 airline pilots who responded to postings or who were approached
by the airline's training department. Part_dpation was voluntary and pilots were paid a nominal
compensation for their cooperation. The participating pilots either had a considerable amount of line
experience on the B-737-300 (n=14), or they were about to finish their fixed-base transition training to the
B-737-300 (n=6). Table 4 describes their biographical data and flight background.
Table 4. Biographical Data and Flight Background of the Participating Pilots
Experienced Pilots _ Transitioning Pilots
(n=14) (n=6)
Age 41.1 (10.1) years i 41.0 (4.0) years
[mean(std. dev.)] i
Total Flying
Time
8,471 (4,539) hours 5,183 (1,273) hours
[mean(s_L _v.)]
"Glass Cockpit" _
Experience 1,011 (582) hours _ 0 hours
[mean(std. dev.)] i
Procedure
Pilots were asked to fly individually a 60 minute scenario on a fixed-base B-737-300 part-task trainer.
This simulator works based on an actual aircraft data base. It is equipped with all relevant cockpit
instruments, and it allows for any operation except hand-flying the aircraft below 1,000 ft AGL.
Upon arrival at the simulator, pilots were provided with the necessary paperwork (e.g. charts, approach
plates, weather, weight manifest) as well as the LAX-ATIS and their dearance (see Appendix A). The
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participants were asked to take their seat in the cockpit, and to act as Pilot-Flying (PF) during this flight.
They were given time to familiarize themselves with the cockpit set-up and the intended flight. The
instructor told them that weather was not a consideration, no NOTAMs existed for the flight, and all
appropriate checklists would be completed during the flight.
The instructor took care of the cockpit set-up for the participant. He occupied the empty seat and acted
as pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) and ATC throughout the flight. An observer was seated behind both pilots to
collect behavioral and verbal data throughout the test run and to introduce scenario events through
manipulation of the simulator (e.g., introduction of failures).
With respect to FMS-related tasks, each pilot was given the following instructions:
- All FMS-related work has to be done by the PF (the participant) after activation of the autopilot at 1,000
ft AGL.
- Altitude changes on the MCP will be taken care of by the PNF (the instructor) as in actual line
operations and the PF can command the PNF to carry out spedfied MCP manipulations for him.
- All tasks should be carried out by the participant the same way as in real line operations.
- Don't be in a hurry on the CDU or MCP! We want to keep track of what you are doing. Speed is not
important for our purposes.
At various points during the scenario, pilots were asked to perform or describe FMS-related tasks, or
they were asked questions concerning their FMS-related knowledge. After completion of the flight,
additional questions were asked concerning FMS logic and operations, and the pilots were given the
chance to ask the instructor about tasks and events that occurred during the test run.
RESULTS
The data were first analyzed across all of the participants to identify tasks and events that posed
problems to the majority of pilots. Subsequently, pilots' behavior and misconceptions with respect to
these probes were looked at in greater detail. A dedicated section will deal with any significant
differences between the performance of pilots with glass cockpit line-experience versus those without
glass cockpit experience. For some tasks that allow pilots to choose among several different approaches,
the preferred strategies for the two pilot groups will be presented. Finally, problems related to mode
activation which occurred across different tasks are examined more closely.
Problematic tasks/events
Less than six pilots (30 %) had any difficulties carrying out the routine tasks of changing a route (i.e.
creating/entering new waypoints/airways), intercepting a radial, building/executing a holding pattern,
installing an ILS approach, and entering crossing restrictions for waypoints along the route.
On the contrary, more than 14 pilots (70 %) showed deficiencies in performing the following tasks:
- Aborting a takeoff at 40 kts with A/Ts on
- Antidpating ADI mode indications throughout TO roll
- Anticipating when GA mode becomes armed throughout landing
- Disengaging APPR mode after LOC and G/S capture
- Explaining speed management for VNAV Path vs. VNAV Speed Descent
- Defining end of descent point for VNAV Path vs. VNAV Speed Descent
- Describing consequences of G/S loss above/below 1,500 ft.
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Thefirst threeof thesetasksarerelatedtomode awareness either in the context of dealing with an FMS-
related failure or in the sense of anticipating system status and behavior. The last four tasks point out
deficiencies in pilots' knowledge of the functional structure of the system. The results revealed in detail
the kinds of problems that can arise in pilot-automation interaction and the misconceptions that pilots
can have about the FMS.
A. Aborted Takeoff
Immediately before receiving their takeoff clearance, pilots were asked what procedure they would use
to abort the takeoff at 40 kts. Although it was emphasized that the takeoff had to be aborted at 40 kts
(i.e. before THR HOLD is reached at 64 kts when the pilot can manually position the throttles), 16 pilots
(80 %) described the procedure as follows: "Throttles back, reversers, and manual brakes". They did not
mention that the autothrottles would have to be disconnected to prevent the throttles from coming back
up again after manual intervention. When explicitly asked whether they would also disconnect the
autothrottles, 3 participants (15 %) realized that they had missed that item. Two pilots (10%) were not
sure about this question and suggested that they would hold the A/Ts back manually, "just in case ''4-
Only 4 pilots (20 %) responded immediately by disconnecting the autothrottles to abort the takeoff. They
were asked why this action is necessary, and all but one pilot properly described the reason. This one
pilot explained that he would disconnect the autothrottles because he thought that this was standard
procedure, but he indicated that he was not aware of the consequences of failing to carry out this step.
B. Anticioation of ADI indications dudna takeoff
Pilots were asked for their expectations concerning ADI mode indications throughout the takeoff roll as
these indications are supposed to help monitor whether the system is working properly and as expected.
The relevant indications that appear in the lower left comer of the ADI are N1, i.e., the autothrottles are
in charge and will go to takeoff thrust, and THR HOLD, i;e., the aircraft has reached 64 kts, the
autothrottles will go to takeoff thrust but they can now be overridden manually by the pilot. Five of the
pilots (25 %) expected to see both these indications. Twelve subjects (60 %) only mentioned either THR
HOLD (15 % of the pilots) or N1 (45 % of the pilots) as an indication during takeoff. And another three
pilots (15 %) could not predict any of the mode indications.
The CA mode becomes available when descending below 2,000 ft radio altitude with the autothrottles
armed. Out of 20 pilots, only 5 recalled the altitude at which this occurs. Eight pilots (40%) knew that the
availability of the mode depends upon reaching a certain altitude but they did not remember the actual
height. Another 4 pilots (20%) replied that they had no idea when the mode becomes available, and the
remaining 3 pilots (15%) assumed that the GA mode is available upon glideslope capture.
D. Disenaaaement of the APPR mode after LOC and G/S caotum
When asked to disengage the APPR mode after localizer and glide-slope had been captured, only 3
pilots (15 %) could recall the three ways of accompfishing this: either pushing the TOGA buttons on the
4In the debriefing, these pilots argued that they could still hold the throttles back manually to prevent
them from advancing without disengaging them. But it is not clear that they would do so in the actual
situation because, without understanding the FMS behavior, it seems unlikely that they would anticipate
the need for manual intervention.
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throttles,turningboth FDsandtheA/P off, or retuningtheVHFradio1. Sevenpilots (35 %) did not
know of any procedure for disengaging the APPR mode. Three participants (15 %) were familiar with
two of the three different options.
The solutions suggested by the remaining seven pilots (35 %) included at least one possible approach,
but also at least one approach that would not result in the disengagement of the APPR mode:
- 6 pilots (30%) thought that they could disengage the APPR mode by pushing the APPR key again,
- 5 pilots (25%) expected that engaging another pitch mode such as V/S or ALT HOLD would get them
out of the APPR mode,
- 5 pilots (25%) thought that they would have to disengage either the A/P or the FDs, but not both,
- 4 pilots (20%) assumed that choosing another roll mode would solve the problem (e.g. HDG SEL or
VORLOC).
E. Soeed Mana_oement and End of Descent Point -- VNAV Path vs. VNAV Soeed
Knowledge of the control modes (pitch and power) used to maintain a target airspeed during a descent
is important for pilots to be able to monitor and anticipate aircraft behavior. It allows them to recognize
unexpected activities or the lack of timely aircraft response. Nine out of 20 pilots knew how the FMS
maintains target speed during a VNAV Path descent. Eight pilots (40%) were aware of the speed control
mode during a VNAV Speed descent. With respect to the end-of-descent point of a Path vs. Speed
descent, the results were similar. Twelve pilots (60 %) were aware of the end of descent during a VNAV
Path descent, 9 pilots (45 %) knew at what point the VNAV Speed descent would end.
F. The conseouences of a G/S failure above/below 1.500 ft
After G/S capture, a G/S signal loss was simulated at approximately 3,000 ft. Upon realizing the
problem, pilots were asked about the consequences of this event. Fifty four per cent of the pilots could
provide the correct answer. When asked whether a G/S failure at a lower altitude (below 1,500 ft)
would have different effects, only 15 % of the pilots knew the answer. Twenty-three percent of the
participants did not know the answer to either question.
Although detection time was not measured for this failure, it was observed that it took some pilots a
rather long time (in some cases, several minutes) to even realize the problem although they were
looking directly at the ADI (with the G/S indications and FD bars disappearing) during this phase of
flight..
Differences Between Line-Experienced Versus Inexperienced Pilots
Major differences in performance between line-experienced versus transitioning pilots were seen only
with respect to three of the tasks within the scenario.
When asked to intercept the LAX 248 degree radial, all 6 inexperienced pilots had difficulties carrying
out the task using LNAV compared to only 50% of the 14 experienced pilots. None of the inexperienced
pilots realized the need for building a fictitious waypoint on the radial. When asked about the
consequences of using an excessive vertical rate of climb in the V/S mode, again 100 % of the
inexperienced six subjects could not provide the correct answer compared to only 5 of the participants
with line experience (36%). And finally, 83% of the six pilots without line experience could not describe
how to program an intermediate descent on the VNAV CRZ page for avoiding traffic whereas none of
the 14 experienced pilots had any problem with this task.
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Preferred Strategies of FMS Usage
In addition to probes that only allowed for one correct answer or reaction, some situations were built
into the scenario that required that pilots choose among different options to carry out the task. We asked
pilots to use the automation as they would in real line operations. This provided us with behavioral data
on their primary choice of modes for a given task under specified circumstances. Subsequently, we
asked them about other possible strategies for achieving the same objective.
A. lntemeotino a Radial outbound without a wavooint at a low altitude
There are two possible methods for accomplishing this task. Pilots can use the VOR/Localizer mode
(VORLOC) which involves MCP manipulations, or they can use LNAV which requires working with the
CDU. As Rgure 4 illustrates, most of the pilots with glass cockpit experience prefe _n'ed to use VORLOC
( ), while the pilots in transition to glass cockpits preferred to use LNAV (83 %P.While it is possible
to use LNAV for this task, after one creates a fictitious fix outbound, MCP-VORLOC is the faster and
easier method to do the job at low altitudes. It requires less pilot input and no heads-down time as
compared to creating a fix using the CDU.
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B. Speed-Restricted Climb to 5.000 ft
Again there are two options available to pilots - using the LVL CHG mode via MCT manipulations or
modifying data on the CDU CLB page and activating the VNAV mode. In this case, all of the pilots in
transition and 79 % of the experienced glass cockpit pilots preferred the MCT-LVL CHG mode. Again,
using the MCP minimizes heads down time, which is important as the aircraft is still at a very low
altitude during this task.
5Some of the pilots in transition (16%) could not think of any second method at all.
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G. Unnlanned Descent for Traffic at FL 290
In this situation, the pilots could either choose the LVL CHG mode on the MCP or they could "program"
the descent on the CDU CRZ page and then activate VNAV. As Figure 6 shows, the majority of line-
experienced pilots chose to descend using VNAV (79 %) while most of the less experienced pilots
preferred to use the LVL CHG (MCP) mode (83 %). When asked why they preferred VNAV, the
experienced pilots explained that, since they were at FL 290, they felt they had enough time to program
the CDU. They also said that they would prefer to modify the VNAV data right away rather than switch
between VNAV and another descent mode at a lower level of automation which makes it more difficult
for them to keep track of active modes and targets.
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Problems of Mode Activation
Another interesting result refers to failures to engage or re-engage a mode after entering (new) target
values into either the MCP or the CDU. This omission occurred at least once during the scenario for 5 of
the 6 transitioning pilots (the total number of omissions for this group was 9). Only two of the 14
experienced pilots forgot to engage an appropriate mode, and this occurred only once for each of them.
The problem occurred four times in regard to the LNAV mode, six times with respect to the VNAV
mode and once concerning the LVL CHG mode.
In seven of the failures to engage a mode, all required entries into the CDU or MCP were made, but no
mode was activated. In the remaining four instances, the pilot would first use an MCP mode (e.g., HDG
SEL) to get the system started towards the target, then he would enter the new target data into the CDU,
but ultimately he would forget to switch from the MCP mode to VNAV or LNAV which use the entered
CDU values as targets. The fact that in the majority of cases pilots forgot to engage VNAV or LNAV
(rather than an MCP mode) after entering new target data may be related to the spatial separation
between the data entry unit (CDU) and the VNAV- and LNAV-buttons which are located on the MCP.
Another problem related to mode engagement was the attempt to activate a mode without the
prerequisites for this activation being met: Three (50%) of the Izansitioning and one of the 14
experienced pilots tried to engage VORLOC without being in the manual radio mode as required. Three
(50%) of the transitioning and 5 of the 14 experienced pilots engaged the APPR mode without lowering
the MCP altitude first, and they were surprised to find that the aircraft did not start the descent.
DISCUSSION
This study verifies and expands on the results obtained from the previous corpus gathering studies of
pilot-automation interaction (Sarter and Woods, in press). It confirms that most of the difficulties in
pilot-automation interaction are related (a) to a lack of mode awareness and (b) to gaps in pilots' mental
models of the functional structure of the automation. These kinds of problems seem to occur primarily
in the context of non-normai time critical situations such as an aborted takeoff. Problems related to such
situations may be under-reported in surveys because these situations rarely occur in line operations. In
this study, however, every participant was forced to cope with non-normal events in the scenario. In this
way, latent problems in pilot-FMS interaction could be revealed.
For the majority of pilots, it was difficult or impossible to manage the cockpit automation in three non-
normal situations in the scenario - an aborted takeoff, the need to disengage an automatic approach
mode for collision avoidance, and the loss of the glideslope during final descent. In the case of the
aborted takeoff, 65% of all partidpants did not understand how the autothrottle controls the aircraft
throughout the takeoff. Fifteen per cent of the pilots knew about the ongoing mode activities and
transitions, but they were not capable of applying thisknowledge to the situation at hand. In terms of
behavior, this resulted in only 4 pilots responding correctly, and one of them did not seem to completely
understand the basis for this action. Another non-normal time-critical event in the scenario was the
request to disengage the APPROACH mode after localizer and glideslope capture. While most of the
pilots knew about at least one way of complying with this request, 14 pilots also suggested at least one
ineffective approach. If, in a real world case, ATC told the pilot to immediately change heading and/or
altitude to avoid a collision, there would be no time for failed attempts to disengage the mode. The pilot
would have to respond immediately. This problem is related to the need for an interface design that
indicates available options to help the pilot intervene quickly and directly when necessary. In the case of
the third non-normal event in the scenario, the loss of the G/S during final descent, it was observed that
it took many pilots fairly long to even realize that an anomaly had occurred, even though delay times
could not be measured precisely. Although they were looking directly at the ADI display at this stage of
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thesimulatedflight, it tooksomepilotsseveralminutesto realizethat the G/S indication and the FD
bars had disappeared. This problem illustrates that cueing by absence may not be a good technique for
indicating the presence of an anomaly. Not only was anomaly detection relatively slow, about one half
of the partidpants were not aware of the consequences of a loss of the G/S. The scenario contained a
variety of other probes of the pilots" ability to be "ahead of the FMS", i.e., the ability to antidpate future
system behavior which can change not only in response to current pilot input but also as a result of
changes in the environment, previous pilot input, or for protection purposes. For example, only one out
of 20 participants could predict the entire sequence of expected mode indications for the takeoff roll.
Similarly, only five of the participants knew when to expect the indication that the Go-Around mode is
now available.
The underlying reason for the observed problems seems to be a lack of mode awareness. In the context
of simpler devices and environments, mode awareness usually refers to the adequate assessment of the
currently active mode status. But our results show that in the context of the highly dynamic and
complex cockpit environment, other aspects of mode awareness are more critical. In these systems, the
pilots' role has changed from active manipulator of the aircraft to supervisor of the automated systems.
To fulfill this role, pilots have to a) have a thorough understanding of what a mode means in terms of
system behavior and b) have to be "ahead of the FMS", i.e. they have to be able to anticipate future
system behavior which can change not only in response to his own input but also as a result of changes
in the environment or for protection purposes (see Reason, 1990).
Operational Costs of Technology Centered Automation
New automation is developed because of some payback (precision, more data, reduced staffing, etc.) for
some benefidary (the individual practitioner, the organization, the industry, society). But often
overlooked is the fact that new automated devices also create new demands for the individual and
groups of practitioners responsible for operating and managing these systems. The new demands can
include new or changed tasks (setup, operating sequences, etc.), and new cognitive demands are created
as well. There are new knowledge requirements (e.g., how the automation functions), new
communication tasks (e.g., instructing the automation in a particular case), new data management tasks
(e.g., finding the relevant page within the CDU page architecture), new aRentional demands (tracking
the state of the automation), and new forms of error or failure (e.g., mode error). This study reveals
some of these kinds of costs that occur in the context of the current generation of cockpit automation -
costs that could be minindzed or eliminated through skillful design of hnman-centerecl automation
(Billings, 1991).
Mode Error and Mode Awareness
Two of the cost centers associated with changes in automation are the possibility of new forms of error
or failure and the possibility of creating new cognitive demands for practitioners. Interlinked examples
of these effects of automation for the glass cockpit case seem to be mode error and mode awareness.
Devices that allow some thing to be done one way in one mode and another way in another mode create
the possibility of mode errors where one executes an intention in a way appropriate to one mode when
the device is actually in another mode (Norman, 1988). Automated systems like those in the glass
cockpit cannot be characterized by a single mode setting. There are a number of subsystems each
involving a number of possible mode settings. This increase in the power and flexibility of automated
resources creates a form of operational complexity that increases the potential for mode errors.
But advanced automation like the FMS extends the kinds of mode related problems that can occur
because system status and behavior can change independent of immediate and direct pilot commands
due to situation factors or protection limits (Sarter and Woods, 1992). This means that a new cognitive
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demandis created:the needto maintainawarenessof externallyinduced mode transitions. As the
pilot's role has changed from active manipulator of the aircraft to supervisor of automated systems,
effective situation awareness requires pilots to stay "ahead of the FMS,' i.e., he or she has to be able to
anticipate future system behavior or detect system failures (Sarter and Woods, 1991). However, in this
study, only five out of 20 participants could predict the operationally most significant mode indications
(N1 and THR HOLD) for the takeoff roll and only 5 of the participants knew when to expect the
indication that the Go-Around mode is available.
One way to interpret the results of this study and the complementary results of Sarter and Woods (in
press) is that many of the observed problems result from a lack of mode awareness - the pilots lost
track of system targets and missed mode changes that occurred independent of immediate pilot
commands. Maintaining mode awareness requires that pilot attend to and integrate data from a variety
of indications in the cockpit such as the Flight Mode Annunciations on the Attitude Director Indicator,
the visualization of the programmed route of flight on the Horizontal Situation Indicator, or the display
of target values on the Mode Control Panel. Breakdowns in mode awareness may be due to
characteristics of these indications given the nature of the cognitive demands of high tempo phases of
flight or non-normal flight situations. Another contributor to these attentional breakdowns may be limits
and gaps in the pilots mental models of the automated resources.
New Knowledae Reouirements
The transition to glass cockpit aircraft requires pilots to learn a great deal about the FMS and other flight
deck automated subsystems. As the results of this study show and given the results of the previous
corpus building studies, there are a number of areas where pilots have gaps in the their understanding
of the functional structure of the FMS. By forcing pilots to deal with various non-normal situations, gaps
or errors in their understanding of how the automation works in various situations were revealed.
Again, the results indicated that pilots do not have an accurate model of how VNAV descent modes
work and that the displays do not help them in tracking either the targets or the control modes used by
VNAV Path and VNAV Speed descents. Overall, this study confirms previous results (Sarter and
Woods, in press) and shows that these problems can occur even with pilots who have relatively
extensive glass cockpit experience.
Note the interaction between two factors. Breakdowns in mode awareness can be due in part to a lack of
effective feedback on the state of the automation and in part due to buggy mental models of the
automation. The lack of feedback on the state of the automation can in turn limit pilots' ability to learn
from experience and correct or elaborate their mental models of system function over time. It also limits
their ability to learn to perceive the state of the automation from the available indications. A third factor
further complicates the difficulty. Many of flight situations that stress these problems occur relatively
rarely in line operations. This combination has broad repercussions for training pilots to manage highly
automated aircraft First, training must go beyond simply providing pilots with facts about the FMS.
The results showed that sometimes pilots possessed knowledge in the sense of being able to recite the
facts, but that they were unable to apply the knowledge successfully in an actual flight context. This is
called the problem of inert knowledge. Training must condifionalize knowledge to the contexts where it
is utilized. Second, pilots need to learn not simply how the automated system works, but also how to
work the system. This will require scenarios and instruction designed around managing the transitions
between different modes of automation. Third, since pilots do learn a subset of methods to be able to
make the system work under routine conditions, situations that challenge their current understanding
may arise relatively infrequently (or go unnoticed as such in part due to lack of feedback about the state
and behavior of the FMS). This means that an ongoing learning programs will need to be devised that
help even experienced glass cockpit pilots discover and correct subtle bugs in their mental models of the
FMS or to elaborate their understanding of how the automation works in particular situations in a risk-
free environment
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Knowledae Miscalibration
The results indicate that pilots have gaps in their understanding of the functional structure of the FMS.
Furthermore, there are some indications in the data that pilots are mJscalibrated with respect to their
understanding of the FMS, that is, the pilots may not be aware of the gaps in their mental models. An
expert is well calibrated if they are aware of the areas and circumstances where they have correct
knowledge and the areas where their knowledge is incomplete or limited. If the expert is overconfident
and believes that they understand areas where in fact their knowledge is incomplete or limited, then that
person is said to be miscalibrated (e.g., Wagenaar and Keren, 1986). Note that degree of calibration is
not necessarily correlated with expertise.
When we compare pilot responses to questions like, "how much do you agree or disagree with the
statement: "there are modes and features of the FM that l still don't understand"" (Wiener, 1989; Sarter
and Woods, in press) to the behavioral data in this study, there is some indication that glass cockpit
pilots are overconfident and miscalibrated about how well they understand the FMS. When forced to
cope with flight situations that challenge their ability to monitor and manage cockpit automation by the
design of the scenario, the number and severity of pilots' problems was higher than would be expected
from previous survey data, in particular for pilots with line experience in glass cockpits. Some of the
participants in this study made comments in the post-scenario debriefinga such as: "I never knew that I
did not know this. I just never thought about this situation." Similar results have been obtained in
studies of physician interaction with computer based automated devices in the surgical operating room
(Cook et al., 1991; Moll van Charante et all., 1992)
There are several factors that could contribute to the observed miscalibration. First, areas of incomplete
or buggy knowledge can remain hidden from pilots because pilots have the capability to work around
these areas by slicking with a few well practiced and well understood methods. In addition, flight
situations that force pilots into areas where their knowledge is limited and miscalibrated may arise
infrequently. Second, studies of calibration have indicated that the availability of feedback, the form of
feedback and the attentional demands of processing feedback can effect knowledge calibration (e.g.,
Wagenaar and Keren, 1986). Problems with ineffective feedback on the state and behavior of the FMS
that were observed in this study and reported in previous studies of pilot interaction with cockpit
automation (e.g., Norman, 1990) could be a factor that contributes to poor calibration of pilots, i.e., a
lack of awareness of the gaps in their mental models of the FMS. The relationship between poor
feedback and miscalibrated practitioners was also found in studies of physician-automation interaction
(e.g., Cook et al., 1991). Knowledge miscalibration in pilots, if it is widespread, is one factor that could
lead to under-reporting of problems with cockpit automation in survey studies.
How to Manaoe Automated Resources
Ctx_pit automation provides a large number of functions and options for carrying out a given flight
task under different circumstances. For example, the FMS provides at least five different mechanisms at
different levels of automation for changing altitude. This flexibility is normally construed as a benefit
that allows the pilot to select the mode or option best suited to a particular flight situation (e.g., time and
speed constraints). However, this flexibility creates new demands as well. Pilots must learn and know
about the functions of the different modes, how to coordinate which mode to use when, how to switch
from one mode to another smoothly. In other words, the pilots must know how the automated system
works and he or she must develop skill at how to work the system. To meet the latter criterion, a pilot
must:
- learn about all of the available options,
- learn and remember how to deploy them across a variety of operational circumstances, especially
rarely occurring but more difficult or more critical ones,
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- learnandremembertheinterfacemanipulationsrequired to invoke the different modes or features,
- learn and remember how to interpret or where to find the various indications about which option is
active or armed and what are its associated target values.
The results of this study indicate that pilots become proficient and maintain their proficiency on only a
subset of the modes and options provided by the FMS. Further evidence for this phenomenon was
provided by previous FMS-related studies (Sarter and Woods, in press) and by studies of human-
machine interaction in other domains (e.g., Rosson, 1983; Cook et al., 1990) where users hardly ever use
more than a small subset of the options provided. This is, in part, a consequence of the increased costs
involved in learning extra functions, but it also allows practitioners to protect themselves from having to
make difficult decisions due to an increased number of alternatives. In the case of the FMS, pilots try to
manage the system within a set of stereotypical responses or techniques. In this study, we were able to
compare the tactics selected by pilots with line experience in glass cockpits versus pilots without
previous glass cockpit experience. The results indicate that, over time, pilots learn to select among the
various options depending on situation factors (e.g., altitude, time constraints) and on expectations (e.g.,
the likelihood of deviation from plan). But pilots who just had finished their transition training were
much less sensitive to these contextual factors. They tended to always use the highest level of
automation independent of context.
Note that, in higher tempo phases of flight, more experienced pilots chose to use intm'mediate levels of
automation which use the MCP as the interface over higher levels of automation that require CDU
interaction. The MCP based modes generally require less interaction, less head down time, less
diversion of attention to the interface itself (e.g., remembering the necessary interface manipulations). In
addition, the modes of automation accessed through the MCP as an interface tend to respond only to
direct pilot input (e.g., the pilot enters a target value, activates a mode of control, the automation then
responds by capturing and maintaining that target value until another pilot command is received) and
do not initiate a sequence of automated system activities. This may explain previous results that pilots
see the MCP and the CDU as separate systems (Sarter and Woods, in press) despite the fact that from an
engineering point of view both are part of an integrated FMS. Operationally, interacting with the MCP
modes has a different character than 'programming' the CDU. This means that general questions about
pilots" attitudes towards cockpit automation in general are ambiguous, and pilots may vary from each
other and from the investigator in their interpretation of what aspects of cockpit automation the
question refers to.
SUMMARY
The results of this and previous studies of pilot interaction with cockpit automation in commercial
aviation yield consistent results across diverse methods. While pilots seem to be able to "make the
system work" in standard situations, one of the most important results of this study is the discovery of
latent problems with pilot-FMS interaction that can affect even experienced pilots' performance in non-
normal time critical situations. The severity and importance of these problems is underestimated due to
several interacting factors:
- there are gaps in pilots' understanding of the functional structure of the automation,
- the opaque interface between pilots and automation makes it difficult for pilots to track the state and
activity of the automation,
- pilots may not be aware of the gaps in their knowledge about FMS function,
- pilots can "escape" from the CDU to the MCP whenever a situation gets too complicated or time
pressure is too high, and
- the flight situations where these problems help produce unmistakable performance difficulties may
occur infrequently in line observations.
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Thedatain thisstudy, in conjunction with the data from previous studies (e.g., Wiener, 1989; Norman,
1990; Sarter and Woods, in press), point out some of the costs of the "clumsy' use of technological
possibilities from an operational point of view. These costs should provide input to designers trying to
develop human-centered automation and to trainers trying to develop new instructional programs for
developing, maintaining and testing pilot proficiency in managing automated resources. However, it is
important to remember that the problems in pilot interaction with cockpit automation are not inherent
in the technology itself, but rather these problems result from limitations in how the automation and the
human pilots are integrated together as a joint, distributed cognitive system (Hutchins, 1991; Woods,
1993).
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ABSTRACT
New technology is flexible in the sense that it provides practitioners with a large number of
functions and options for carrying out a given task under different circumstances. But this
flexibility also has a price: It is the job of the human supervisor to select the mode best suited to
a particular situation. The practitioner must know more and has new monitoring and
attentional demands to track which mode the automation is in and what it is doing to manage
the underlying processes. When designers proliferate modes, these new cognitive demands
contribute to new mode-related error forms and failure paths. While mode error has been
discussed in human-computer interaction for some time, the increased capabilities of new
automated systems appear to have created new types of mode-related problems, in particular, a
decrease in mode awareness. We explore these new aspects based on results from our own and
related studies of human-automation interaction. In particular, we draw on empirical data from
a series of studies of pilot-automation interaction in commercial glass cockpit aircraft to
illustrate the nature, circumstances, and potential consequences of mode awareness problems in
supervisory control of automated resources. The result is an expanded view of mode error that
takes into account the new demands imposed by more automated systems. We also argue that
in order to be able to develop countermeasures to the new varieties of mode related problems, a
better understanding of the cognitive processes underlying mode awareness and situation
awareness, in general, is needed.
INTRODUCTION
New technology is increasing the potential for automated resources to support human
supervisory controllers. The technology's inherent flexibility allows designers to add a wide
range of capabilities in the name of providing the practitioner with a set of tools that can be
used to optimize system performance across a wide range of circumstances. However, the same
flexibility tends to create and proliferate various modes of operation. This proliferation of
modes that can so easily accompany new levels of automation in complex systems also creates
new cognitive demands on practitioners (Woods, 1993). Practitioners must know more - both,
about how the system works in each different mode and about how to manage the new set of
options in different operational contexts (Sarter and Woods, 1992; 1993). New attentional
demands are created as the practitioner must keep track of which mode the device is in, in order
to select the correct inputs when communicating with the automation and in order to track what
the automation is doing now, why it is doing it, and what it will do next. For example, an
automated cockpit system such as the Flight Management System (FMS) is flexible in the sense
that it provides pilots with a large number of functions and options/or carrying out a given
flight task under different circumstances. There are at least five different methods at different
lSubmitted for Publication
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levelsof automationthat thepilots couldinvoketo changealtitude.This flexibility is usually
portrayedasa benefitthatallowsthepilot to selectthe mode best suited to a particular flight
situation. But this flexibility also has a price: the pilots must know about the functions of the
different modes, how to coordinate which mode to use when, how to "bumplessly' switch from
one mode to another, how each mode is set up to fly the aircraft, and he has to keep track of
which mode is active.. These new cognitive demands can easily congregate at high tempo and
high criticality periods of device use thereby adding new workload at precisely those time
periods where practitioners are most in need of effective support systems. Clumsy use of
technological possibilities, such as the proliferation of modes, creates the potential for new
forms of human-machine system failure and new paths towards critical incidents, e.g., the air
crashes at Bangalore (e.g., Lenorovitz, 1990) and Strasbourg (Monnier, 1992).
In a variety of studies, we have investigated human-automation interaction in the context of
commercial "glass' cockpits (Sarter and Woods, 1992; 1993) and in the context of anesthetic
management under surgery (Cook et al., 1990; Moll van Charante et al., 1992). Based on these
and other studies, we think that the classic concept of mode error is inadequate to describe the
problems in human interaction with today's automated resources. In this paper, we extend the
concept of mode error to take into account the problems caused by new automation capabilities
- mode awareness.
MODE AWARENESS
Multiple modes in devices can create the potential for mode errors. The concept of mode error
has been established as one kind of problem that can occur in human interaction with
computerized devices (Lewis and Norman, 1986) and as a basic kind of erroneous action in
psychological taxonomies of error forms (Norman, 1981). Norman (1988) summarizes the
source of mode error quite simply by suggesting that if one wishes to create or increase the
possibilities for erroneous actions one way is to "... change'the rules. Let something be done one
way in one mode and another way in another mode." When this is the case, a human user can
commit an erroneous action by executing an intention in the way appropriate to one mode of the
device when the device is actually in another mode. Note that mode error is inherently a
human-machine system breakdown in that it requires that the users lose track of which mode
the device is in (or confuse which methods or actions are appropriate to which mode) and it
requires a machine where the same actions and indications mean different things in different
modes of operation. Several studies have shown that human-_omputer interface design and
evaluation should identify computerized devices which have a high potential for mode errors
(e.g., Lewis and Norman, 1986; Cook et al., 1991), and several design techniques have been
proposed to reduced the chances for mode errors (Monk, 1986; Sellen et al., 1992).
The original work on mode error was done primarily in reference to relatively simple
computerized devices, such as word processors. The erroneous actions in question were acts of
commission in carrying out self paced tasks with devices that only reacted to user inputs anti
commands. Increases in the complexity and autonomy of automated systems for event-driven,
dynamic task environments such as commercial aviation flightdecks and anesthetic
management under surgery have resulted in a proliferation of system and interface "modes."
Human supervisory control of automated resources in event-driven task domains is a quite
different type of task environment as compared to the applications in the original research on
mode error. Automation is often introduced as a resource for the human supervisor providing
him with a large number of modes of operation for carrying out tasks under different
circumstances. The human's role is to select the mode best suited to a particular situation, but
to accomplish this he or she must know more and must meet new monitoring and attentional
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demandsto track which mode the automation is in and what it is doing to manage the
underlying process. These cognitive demands can be particularly challenging in the context of
highly automated systems which can change modes on their own based on environmental
inputs or for protection purposes, independent of direct and immediate instructions from the
human supervisor. This capability of highly automated systems drives the demand for mode
awareness, that is, the ability of a supervisor to track and to anticipate the behavior of
automated systems..
What is involved in maintaining mode awareness is determined to a large extent by the design
and capabilities of the automated resources and especially the interface between the automation
and the people in the system. Therefore, how have changes in automation and in the interface
between person and automated resources impacted mode awareness? How has the human's
role and tasks changed and how can they be supported?
THE COMPLEXITY OF MODES IN AUTOMATED SYSTEMS AND THE CHALLENGE TO
MODE AWARENESS
Early automated systems were characterized by a fairly small number of modes. In most cases,
these modes provided the passive background on which the operator would act by entering
target data and by requesting system operations. Another characteristic of these early systems
was that they would only have one overall mode setting for each function to be performed.
Consequently, mode annunciations (indications of the currently active mode and of transitions
between modes) could be dedicated to one spatial location on the display. Finally, consequences
of a breakdown in mode awareness tended to be fairly small, in part because of the short time-
constant feedback loops involved in these systems. The operator seemed to be able to detect and
recover from erroneous actions relatively quickly.
The flexibility of more advanced technology allows automation designers to develop much
more complicated mode-rich systems . Modes proliferated by providing multiple levels of
automation and by providing more than one mode option for many individual functions. The
result is numerous mode indications distributed over multiple displays each containing just that
portion of the mode status data corresponding to a particular system or subsystem.
Furthermore, the designs allow for interactions across the various modes. The increased
capability of the automated resources themselves creates increased delays between user input
and feedback about system behavior. This increase to longer time-constant feedback loops
increases the difficulty of error or failure detection and recovery and challenges the human's
ability to maintain awareness of the active modes, the armed modes, the contingent interactions
between environmental status and mode behavior, and the contingent interactions across
modes.
A very important trend relates to the input sources that can evoke changes in system status and
behavior. Early systems would change their mode status and behavior only in response to
operator input. Advanced technology, on the other hand, responds to operator input as well as
situational and system factors. In the case of the Flight Management System in highly automated
cockpits, for example, a mode transition can occur as an immediate consequence of operator
input. But it can also happen when a preprogrammed intermediate target (e.g., a target altitude)
is reached or when the system changes its mode in order to prevent the pilot from putting the
aircraft into an unsafe configuration.
Even the aspect of operator input has itself become more complicated as the complexity of the
system of automated resources has increased. Incidents and accidents have shown that there is
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an increasedrisk of inadvertentactivationof modesby theoperator.A modecannot only be
activatedthroughdeliberateexplicitselection of the mode by pushing the corresponding button.
In addition, pushing a button can result in the activation of other different modes depending on
the system status at the time of manipulation. The resulting system behavior can be disastrous
but may be missed by the operator ff adequate feedback is not provided to support mode
awareness.
An example of such an inadvertent mode activation contributed to a major recent accident in the
aviation domain (the Bangalore crash; e.g., Lenorovitz, 1990 ). In that case, the pilot put the
aircraft into a mode called OPEN DESCENT without realizing it. This resulted in the aircraft
speed being controlled by pitch rather than thrust, i.e., throttles went to idle. In that mode, the
automation ignores any preprogrammed altitude constraints. To maintain the pilot-selected
target speed without power, the automation had to use an excessive rate of descent which
ultimately led to the crash of the aircraft short of the runway. How could this happen?
There are at least three different ways of activating the OPEN DESCENT mode. First, it can be
selected by pulling the ALTITUDE knob after selecting a lower altitude. Second, it can be
activated by pulling the SPEED knob provided the aircraft is in the so-called EXPEDITE mode at
that point in time. And third, the OPEN DESCENT becomes active when selecting a lower
altitude while in the ALTITUDE ACQUISITION phase. This latter indirect option contributed to
the above accident. The pilot must not have been aware of the fact that the aircraft was within
200 feet of the previously entered target altitude (which puts the system into the ALTITUDE
ACQUISmON mode). Consequently, he may not have expected the selection of a lower altitude
at that point in time to result in a mode transition. As he did not expect any mode change, he
may not have closely monitored his mode annunciations and thus missed the transition. It was
not until 10 seconds before impact that the crew discovered what had happened; too late for
them to recover with the engines at idle.
Display modes are another factor aggravating the problem'of mode awareness. In some devices,
the current mode configuration does not only determine what control functions become
activated by a given input; rather, these devices also interpret user-entered target values
differently depending on the active display mode. In the following example, it is easy to see how
this may result in unintended system behavior. In a current glass cockpit aircraft, pilots enter a
desired vertical speed or a desired flight path angle via the same display. The interpretation of
the entered value depends on the active display mode. But although the verbal expressions for
different targets differ considerably (for example, a vertical speed of two thousand five hundred
feet versus a flight path angle of two-point-five degrees), these two targets on the display look
almost the same. The pilot has to verify the mode indication for this display instead of the
display format supporting an intuitive, mentally economical apprehension of the active mode. In
this case, the problem is further aggravated by the fact that the pilot is increasingly removed
from the actual ongoing process as previously available cues about system behavior such as
moving throttles or noise may have been reduced or removed in the design process.
The behavior and capabilities of the machine agent in human-machine systems have changed
considerably. In simpler devices, each system activity was dependent upon operator input;
consequently, in order for a lack of mode awareness to become operationally significant, the
operator had to act to evoke undesired system behavior. In more automated systems, the level
of animacy of machine agents has dramatically increased. Once activated, systems are capable of
carrying out long sequences of tasks autonomously. For example, advanced Flight Management
Systems can be programmed to automatically control the aircraft from takeoff through landing.
inadvertent mode settings and selections may not produce visible consequences for a long time
complicating the process of error or failure detection. This creates the possibility of errors of
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omission(i.e., failure to intervene) in addition to errors of commission as a consequence of a
lack of mode awareness.
Another complicating factor that makes it difficult to maintain awareness of the active mode
configuration is the fact that many systems allow for simultaneous use by multiple practitioners
rather than input by just one individual user. Tracking system status and behavior becomes
more difficult if it is possible for other users to interact with the system without the need for
consent by all of the practitioners involved. This problem is most obvious when two
experienced operators have developed different strategies of system use. When they have to
cooperate, it can be particularly difficult for them to maintain awareness of the history of
interaction with the system which may determine the effect of the next system input.
All of the factors mentioned above challenge a human supervisor's ability to maintain mode
awareness in highly automated systems. The results of a number of studies of human-
automation interaction in a variety of domains have indicated that problems in mode awareness
are often a consequence of technology centered automation (e.g., Sarter and Woods, 1992 and
1993; Cook et al., 1991; Moll van Charante et al., 1992). In the following section, we will examine
in more detail results of a series of studies on pilot-automation interaction that illustrates the
trends in mode awareness problems in the context of the mode-rich cockpit environment.
SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON MODE AWARENESS IN PILOT-AUTOMATION
INTERACTION
The role of pilots in modern glass cockpit aircraft has shifted from direct control of the aircraft
to supervisory control of automated machine agents. One of the core automation systems in
these cockpits is the Flight Management System (FMS) which can be programmed by the pilot to
automatically follow a desired flight path and profile from takeoff through landing. To maintain
awareness of the status and behavior of the various modes of operation within the FMS, pilots
have to gather and integrate a variety of data from numerous different displays In the cockpit.
Inadditiontomonitoringthesenominal indicationsofsystem targetsand status,pilotsneed to
be able to interpret the indications to extract what is implied about current and future system
and aircraft behavior. In other words, the automation is becoming more of a dynamic process in
itself, where the indications are a kind of "raw 'data which require an act of interpretation in
order to become information about current or future states. Interpreting the raw indications
requires the human supervisor to have an adequate mental model of the various automated
modes, their Inter-relationships, and knowledge of how to use these as resources in various
contexts.
Given the fairly low rate of change in aircraft behavior throughout large parts of the flight, the
pilot does not have to continuously monitor the mode annunciations. Rather, he has to be able to
predict the occurrence of transitions in system behavior to attend to the right indications at the
right time. During busy phases of flight (e.g., final approach), numerous changes in system
status and behavior can occur in a very short period of time. During this high tempo phase of
flight, with a large number of concurrent tasks, the crew now has another set of cognitive tasks
to perform - monitoring and interpreting mode annunciations relative to expected behavior.
In a series of studies of pilot-automation interaction, we had the opportunity to investigate the
nature and circumstances of mode-related problems in highly automated glass cockpit aircraft.
In one investigation, we built a corpus of FMS-related problems that were encountered in line
operations (Sarter and Woods, 1992). For this purpose, descriptions of automation surprises
were collected from experienced airline pilots . A second converging activity was to observe
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pilots during their transition training from a conventional to a glass cockpit aircraft, i.e. before
they had a chance to adapt to the system. Analysis of these corpus data suggested that
difficulties in mode awareness and gaps in pilots' understanding of all of the modes of operation
and their interactions contributed to automation surprises and related supervisory control
difficulties. Based on the results from the corpus gathering studies, a field experiment was
carried out to try to examine pilot-automation interaction more closely (Sarter and Woods,
1993). Twenty airline pilots were asked to fly a mission on a part-task flight simulator. The
scenario was designed to contain numerous tasks and events that served as probes of pilots'
mode awareness and of their mental model of the automation . This phenomenon-driven
scenario design permitted on-line data collection on various issues regarding pilot-automation
interaction . In addition, we were able to question the pilots about their knowledge and
assessments of the status and behavior of the automation during low workload phases of the
simulated flight and after completion of the simulation.
These studies provided consistent and converging data to help understand why and under what
circumstances pilots encounter problems related to the interaction with cockpit automation.
Most of the observed difficulties were related to lack of mode awareness and to gaps in mental
models on how the various automated modes work and interact. The problems in coordination
between pilot and automation (e.g., automation surprises) occurred primarily in the context of
non-normal, time-critical situations, for example, aborted takeoff, disengaging an automatic
mode during approach for collision avoidance, and loss of the glideslope signal during final
approach. In the case of the aborted takeoff, 65% of the pilots were not aware that the
autothrottle system was in charge of thrust control. Consequently, they did not disengage the
autothrottles in order to have full manual control of the throttle setting. In the debriefing, 15% of
these pilots could describe the active mode settings and the system activities during takeoff. But
their knowledge was inert, i.e., they had not been capable of applying this knowledge to the
ongoing situation. Overall, only four out of twenty participants responded completely correctly
in managing the automation during the aborted takeoff, and one of these four pilots explained
that he did so because he was trying to comply with standard procedures, not because he
understood what was going on within automation. In the second non-normal situation, the
pilots had to quickly comply with an ATC request to disengage the automatic APPROACH
mode after localizer and glideslope capture in order to change heading and altitude to avoid a
collision. Most of the pilots knew only one of the several methods to disengage the mode, and
fourteen pilots also "knew" at least one inappropriate method which could lead to delayed
responses to the ATC request. In the case of the glide slope loss during final approach, about
one half of the pilots were not aware of the consequences of this event in terms of FMS behavior.
They could not explain the effects in the debriefing, and many of them even had difficulties
detecting the occurrence of the problem during the ongoing simulation.
Another interesting result of this study was related to the future-oriented aspect of mode
awareness. Pilots sometimes had problems antidpatlng system behavior and the associated
mode annunciations. For example, only five of the participant knew when to expect the
indication that the Go-Around mode would be available. Failures to antidpate mode status and
transitions, like this one, indicate a lack of mode awareness which degrades the pilot's ability to
allocate attention effectively and to detect errors, failures, or mistxmununications between pilot
and automation prior to explicit flight events - automation surprises. The more experience
pilots had with the automation, the more they were capable of applying their knowledge about
the advantages and shortcomings of the different modes to manage the automated resources in
different contexts. Pilots with less glass cockpit experience tended to utilize a single strategy or
mode over a wide range of flight circumstances. One could interpret this as an attempt to cope
with the complexity of the automation by ignoring some modes and options, even in situations
where the stereotypical strategy was less than ideal relative to other strategies for managing the
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automatedresources.Finally, there were several instancesof pilots who instructed the
automationby enteringnewflightpathrelated targets but who did not activate a mode of the
automation to work on acquiring these targets. They were surprised when the aircraft did not
respond as expected; they did not realize or understand why their instructions to the
automation had not resulted in the desired change. In some sense, this is a good example to
show how pilots try to communicate with the system in a way analogous to communication
with another human agent. They assume that entering a desired target value is sufficient for the
system (as it would be for a human crewmember) to understand that it is supposed to achieve
this new target and how it is supposed to do so in detail.
These investigations into one specific field of activity illustrate a trend in human-machine
cooperation (Woods, 1993). Technology allows a proliferation of modes of increasing complexity
and capability for autonomous activity. These changes create new cognitive demands for
human supervisory controllers, demands which tend to congregate at higher tempo epochs
where workload demands are highest (cf., also Moll van Charante et al., 1992 for similar results
from another field of practice). The complexity of modes challenges the human supervisor's
ability to track and anticipate the behavior of the automation - mode awareness. Difficulties in
maintaining mode awareness focus on transitions between more quiescent phases or situations
where mode behavior is complex or transitions frequent.
SOURCES OF PROBLEMS IN MODE AWARENESS
The data on problems in mode awareness imply that there are two kinds of contributing factors.
One is buggy mental models. The other is opaque Indications of the status and behavior of the
automation. The former derives from a failure of the designers of automation to anticipate the
new kinds of knowledge demands their automation creates and a failure to provide
mechanisms to help practitioners acquire and maintain this knowledge in ways usable in actual
operational contexts. The latter derives from a failure of designers to support the supervisor's
increasingly challenging cognitive demand of tracking the state and behavior of the automation
as another kind of dynamic process within their scope of responsibility (e.g., Norman, 1990). The
indications of the nominal status of the automation are a kind of data; the practitioner must
interpret this data to develop and maintain an assessment of the automation as process and the
automated process over time. The data on problems in mode awareness strongly imply that this
cognitive demand is poorly supported by the kinds of displays on the state of the automation
currently provided to practitioners. As Earl Wiener likes to put it:. the three most commonly
asked questions on the highly automated flightdeck are - what is it doing? why is it doing that?
what will it do next? (to which we would like to add a fourth - how in the world did we get
into that mode?). The interpretation of data on the automation as process is apparently a
cognitively demanding task with these displays rather than a mentally economical one. This is
troublesome when this cognitive task is important during high tempo, high workload, high
criticality situations.
COPING WITH MODE ERROR AND AIDING MODE AWARENESS
The examination of mode awareness here leads us to several strategic directions for responding
to problems in this cognitive task. First, one can say that mode awareness problems are induced
by the complexity of the technological system. Technological powers for automation are used
dumsily when the cognitive and other kinds of demands on the operational system created by
new automation are ignored (Nor=nan, 1990; Woods, 1993; Woods et al., 1993). This is what we
mean by technology-centered automation (cf., Billings, 1991 for an extensive discussion of
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technology-centeredversushuman<enteredautomation).Thenone avenueto improvethe
human-machinesystemis to reducetheoperationalcomplexityinducedby how technologyis
deployed.In thecaseof modeawareness this can be stated quite dearly - reduce the number
and complexity of the modes. However, there may be a variety of pressures, such as marketing
demands from a diverse set of customers or the methods for optimizing various parameters like
precision or efficiency of resource consumption vary greatly across different operational
circumstances, which reduce the designer's ability to counter mode proliferation.
Two other directions for change probably are very tightly coupled in their implementation in a
real field of practice, although they can be discussed separately. One is to support the new
knowledge demands created by increasingly complex automated resources through new
approaches to training human supervisory controllers. This is much more than simply a new
list of facts about how the automation works. Instead, it must be focused on knowledge
activation in context in order to avoid what we are already seeing - inert knowledge where the
user can recite the facts but fails to use the knowledge effectively in real operational contexts.
Training to enhance skill at control of attention would also be relevant here (Gopher, 1991).
The new knowledge demands requirethatmore attentionbe paid to developingand teaching
knowledge and strategiesfor how to work the system of automated resourcesin varying
operationalcontexts.Finally,theknowledge demands ofnew levelsof automation are strongly
conditionedby a major constraint:iftheautomationiswellengineeredina narrow sense,itwill
work wellina varietyofroutinesituations;theproblems ofsupervisorycontrolwillbe manifest
in situationswith complicatingfactorsthatgo beyond theseroutines.However, thesewillbe
relativelyinfrequent,at leastfor the individualpractitioner.Thus, meeting the knowledge
demands willrequireinvestingin maintainingusableknowledge relevantto the more difficult
but infrequentlyoccurringsituations.Inthis,asinmany othercasesofintroducingnew levelsof
automation (e.g.,Adler,1986;Bereiterand Miller,1988),new automationproduces new training
requirements.
A third direction for change is to develop new forms of aiding mode awareness itself through
changes in the interface and displays that reveal what the automation is doing, why it is doing
that, and what it will do next. The strategy is to provide better indications of what mode the
system is in (to avoid mode errors), how future conditions may produce changes without direct
practitioner intervention, and support better detection of and recovery from mode
misassessments and mode errors when they do occur. Some attempts to do this have been made
by changing the overall format of a display in different modes or changing the cursor shape as
the system transitionsbetween modes. However, sincethe practitioner'svisualchannelsare
often heavily loaded in some fields of practice, signaling mode changes through non-visual
channels such as aural or kinesthetic feedback may be useful (cf., Monk, 1986 and Sellen et al.,
1992 respectively). Another concept is "history" displays of instructions to and of the behavior
of automated systems. Such displays would provide a visual trace of past and prod:ted system
behavior under the current mode configuration. However, such displays would have to be
"intelligent' in that the future behavior of the automated systems is contingent on future events
in the environment.
While there are several suggestions that can be offered on potentially fruitful directions ranging
from generalstrategieson what are effectiveways to dearlysignalmode statusand changes
(e.g., use orienting perceptual channels such as auditory or tactile signals; Monk, 1986; Selien et
al., 1992) to particular tips (e.g., display active targets with mode annunciations), it turns out
that the human error, cognitive engineering and human-computer interaction communities have
barely begun to study the relevant issues to provide the necessary research base to drive or
support practical advice to designers. However, developing such aids probably requires that we
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advanceourunderstandingof howattentionshiftsacrosstheperceptualfield indynamicmulti-
taskdomains(e.g., Eriksen and Murphy, 1987; Jonides and Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1990). In this
kind of field of activity, shifting the focus of attention does not refer to initial adoption of a
focus from some neutral waiting state (Kahneman et al., 1973). Instead, one re-orients attentional
focus to a newly relevant event from a previous state where attention was focused on other data
channels or on other cognitive activities (such as diagnostic search, response planning,
communication to other agents). We need to understand how some practitioners develop a
facility with reorienting attention rapidly to new potentially relevant stimuli (Woods, 1992).
Thus, investigating how to aid mode awareness and how to provide cognitive tools to avoid or
cope with mode related problems is a fruitful avenue for advancing our more basic
understanding of more general issues like the cognitive processes such as control of attention,
workload management, mental simulation - or more simply the panoply of cognitive processes
that go under the generic label of situation awareness.
Another design aiding path that has been proposed to deal with mode related problems is
forcing functions. Forcing functions are defined as "something that prevents the behavior from
continuing until the problem has been corrected" (Lewis and Norman, 1986). Forcing functions
can take a variety of forms: the system can prevent the user from expressing impossible
intentions ("gag"), it can react to illegal actions by doing nothing, or it can explore with the user
what the user's intention was and then help translate this intention into a legal action ('_oelf-
correct", "I'each me", or "Let's Talk About It"). The problem with such forcing functions is that
they require (a) that there is only one legal action/strategy for each intention or (b) that a system
is capable of inferring the user's intention to compare it with his input in order to judge the
acceptability of the input. Such a system would also have to have access to information on the
overall context which can determine whether an action is appropriate. Without these
capabilities, it would have to question almost any action - just in case, and run the hazard of
over-interrupting at the wrong times.
The last direction is to consider supervisory control of, automated resources as a kind of
cooperative or distributed multi-agent architecture. One kind of cooperative agent concept
would be to support mode awareness as a "management by consent" process which requires
that all members of the team, human and machine, need to agree to any input to the system
before it is activated. This approach could help a model or trace of all prior system interactions
and lead to better prediction of future automated behavior. If automation and team work are
supposed to reduce the burden on the practitioner by taking over and sharing tasks, then it
seems counterproductive to require that all input is checked and agreed to by every member of
the team.
Note that all of the above kinds of recommendation are human-centered in the sense that the
costs of clumsy automation are seen in "human error' and that the avenue for reducing
perceived problems in the human element is to recognize that they are symptoms of the
complexities produced by the clumsy use of technological possibilities (Woods et al., 1993).
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONCEPT AND THE STUDY OF SITUATION AWARENESS
Analyzing the Phenomenon of Situation or Mode Awareness
Our results suggests that the design and the capabilities of advanced automated systems make it
more important and at the same time more difficult for their users to maintain awareness of the
status and behavior across the different modes of operation of these systems. Despite the fact
that vectors of technology change are Increasingly challenging mode awareness, little research
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hasyet been done to better understand the relevant human-machine questions. But without this
understanding, it will not be possible to develop effective countermeasures to mode related
problems. The same deficit can be observed for the issue of situation awareness in general where
a long tradition of research has not brought us much closer to being able to understand and
support the phenomenon. What kind of research agenda is needed so that the research base can
be expanded and practical countermeasures can be developed before technology change creates
mode related problems of such magnitude that individual industries cry out for immediate
answers?
First, extended efforts to develop the "right' definition or a consensus definition of situation (and
mode) awareness will probably not be constructive. Rather, the term situation awareness should
be viewed as just a label for a variety of cognitive processing activities that are critical to
dynamic event-driven and multi-task fields of practice. Control of attention (Gopher, 1991),
mental simulation (Klein and C.randall, in press), directed attention (Woods, 1992) , mental
bookkeeping to track the multiple influences that act on a automated dynamic process and the
multiple threads of sub-problems and resulting activity to manage them that go on in dynamic
incidents are just a few of the cognitive processes that may pass under the label of situation
awareness. Analyzing these cognitive processes and understanding what factors affect these
processes should be the focus in the attempt to support situation and mode awareness (cf.,
Endsley, 1988, Tenney et al., 1992, and Sarter and Woods, 1991 for some initial steps). Second, it
appears to us to be futile to try to determine the most important contents of situation awareness
because the significance and meaning of any data is dependent upon the context in which they
appear.
Measuring Situation or Mode Awareness
Conceptual or theoretical developments about thecognitive processes peculiarly associated with
supervisory control of dynamic processes are critical if we'are to develop effective measures of
mode or situation awareness. Measurement techniques cannot be developed or used in a
theoretical vacuum. There are three ma}or categories of measurement, a) subjective ratings, b)
explidt performance measures and c) impHdt performance measures. The use of subjective
measures (e. g., Situation Awareness Rating Technique, SART; Vidulich, 1992), where the
operator is expected to rate his own level of awareness, is problematic on a variety of grounds,
e.g., confusing process and product; because there is field data that misassessments color that
person's whole standing and recall of the incident evolution (for example, video replay of the
participant's behavior coupled with replay of the actual state of affairs is often necessary to get
partidpants to recognize their own misassessments). Subg_2tive measures only seem to make
sense when combined with other measurement techniques, for example, in order to learn about
how well calibrated were the participants in the evolving incident (extending the concept of
how well calibrated is a decision maker to control of attentional focus).
An example of an explidt performance measure to assess situation awareness is Situation
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT; Endsley, 1988). This method requires that
subjects, typically pilots, fly a given mission on a flight simulator. At some random point(s) in
time, the simulation is halted and the cockpit displays and outside view is blanked. The pilot is
then asked a series of questions about the existing situation. The pilot' s answers are later
compared with what was actually going on in the scenario. The agreement between the two
serves as a measure of the pilot's situation awareness. The most important problem associated
with this technique is that halting the simulation and prompting the pilot for information
concerning particular aspects of his situation is likely to disturb the very phenomena which the
investigator wishes to observe. All research methods for the study of attentional and awareness
6O
relatedprocessesufferfromthisdilemma- themethodsof observationdisturbandchangeor
eliminatethe phenomenonunderobservation.For example,one of the important cognitive
constituents of situation awareness is the ability to activate relevant knowledge during the
actual process of handling an evolving incident. Prompting the participant for knowledge
concerning particular aspects of a situation is itself a kind of retrieval cue and relevance marker
that can change what the participant will call to mind. This will reveal what knowledge the pilot
can activate when prompted with investigator cues as to relevance, but it will not shed light on
what knowledge the participant would activate on his own or see as relevant in a par_cular
situation.
The third approach, i.e., implicit performance measures, involves the design of experimental
scenarios that include tasks and events that probe the subject's situation awareness (e.g., Salter
and Woods, 1993). In order for this technique to work, the probes have to be operationally
significant in the sense that they should provide cues to the operator which if perceived by him
should lead to an observable change in behavior. The shortcoming of this technique is that it
assumes a direct relationship between situation awareness and performance. This problem can
be addressed, in part, however, by means of debriefings in which the attempt is made to
determine why a certain behavior did or did not occur. The major advantage of the approach is
that it allows for a focused on-line collection of data while trying to minimize the disruptive
impact of probes on the behavior of the subject any more than is inevitable in any simulated
situation (for a more comprehensive critique of techniques for measuring situation awareness
see, e.g., Tenney et al., 1992; Sarter and Woods, 1991).
CONCLUSIONS
As technology allows for proliferation of more automated modes of operation, human
supervisory control faces new challenges. The technological trends create the need for mode
awareness - human supervisory controllers tracking what their machine counterparts are
doing, what they will do, and why they are doing it But there is hysteresis in changing training
for supervisory controllers and developing displays and interfaces to support collaboration to
catch up with the cognitive demands imposed by clumsy use of technological possibilities. The
result is evidence from field experiments, incident sampling and accidents that mode related
problems in highly automated systems such as loss of mode awareness can contribute to new
error forms and new paths towards disasters.
As a consequence, we need to be concerned with the question of how mode awareness can be
supported successfully. In order to support mode awareness, as well as situation awareness in
general, we need to better understand the set of cognitive processing activities that are involved
in these phenomena. In other words, we need to take a process-oriented rather than a product-
oriented approach to the analysis of the phenomena of mode and situation awareness. This
approach will enable us to identify the reasons for breakdowns in mode and situation
awareness, and it will help point the way towards how to train supervisory controllers and how
to design cognitive tools that support the monitoring, assessment and awareness demands on
supervisory controllers.
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GLOSSARY
ADI
AGL
ALT HOLD
A/P
APPR
ASRS
A/P
A/T' s
ATC
ATIS
CBT
CDU
CRZ
CWS
DES
EFIS
FD
FL
FMC
FMS
GA
G/S
HDG SEL
HSI
ITS
LNAV
LAX
LOC
LOFT
LOS
LVL CHG
MCP
NOTAM
PF
PNF
RTA
THR HOLD
TO
TOD
VNAV
V/S
Attitude Director Indicator
Above Ground Level
Altitude Hold Mode
Autopflot
Approach Mode
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Autopflot
Autothrottles
Air Traffic Control
Automatic Terminal Information Service
Computer-Based Training
Control Display Unit
Cruise
Control Wheel Steering
Descent
Electronic Flight Information System
Flight Director
Flight Level
Flight Management Computer
Flight Management System
Go-Around
Glideslope
Heading Select Mode
Horizontal Situation Indicator
Instrument Landing System
Lateral Navigation Mode
Los Angeles (Identifier)
Localizer
Line-Oriented Flight Training
Line-Oriented Simulation
Level Change Mode
Mode Control Panel
Notice for Airmen
Pilot-Flying
Pilot-Not-Flying
Required Time of Arrival
Throttle Hold
Takeoff
Top-of-Descent
Vertical Navigation Mode
Vertical Speed mode
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